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THE INTERNATIONALIZATION 
OF AGENCY ACTIONS 
Jason Marisam* 
 
U.S. agencies routinely base their domestic regulations on international 
considerations, such as the benefits of coordinating American and foreign 
standards or the foreign policy advantages of a particular policy.  I refer to 
this phenomenon as the internationalization of agency actions.  This Article 
examines what the internationalization of agency actions means for agency 
decision-making processes, institutional design, and legal doctrine.  It 
creates a stylized model of how agencies determine whether to coordinate 
their standards with foreign regulations.  Among other institutional design 
findings, it shows that court opinions that reduce the stringency of judicial 
review when agencies implement internationally coordinated standards 
make such coordination more likely to occur, but they simultaneously 
deprive the executive of bargaining power because U.S. agencies cannot 
credibly threaten that any coordinated agreement must align more closely 
with U.S. values or risk being overturned in U.S. courts.  This Article also 
develops a taxonomy of international factors relied on by agencies and 
applies that taxonomy to help clarify the doctrinal issue of whether and 
when agencies can use international factors to justify their actions in court.  
This taxonomical approach shows how the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Massachusetts v. EPA can reasonably be read to allow agencies to invoke a 
far broader range of foreign policy rationales than some prevailing views 
suggest. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In nearly every area of domestic regulatory law, agencies today base their 
regulations in part on international considerations, such as the benefits of 
harmonizing U.S. and foreign standards or the foreign policy advantages of 
a particular policy.  I refer to this phenomenon as the internationalization of 
agency actions.  For a smattering of examples from the Obama 
Administration, consider the following proposed or final rulemakings: 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recently proposed strict 
limits on greenhouse gas emissions from new coal plants in part because 
doing so would “demonstrate global leadership” on climate change and 
signal to China a U.S. commitment to the collaborative development of 
carbon capture technology.1 
The Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board 
established capital ratio standards for banks that were “measured in a 
manner consistent with the international leverage ratio” set by a group of 
international regulators known as the Basel Committee.2 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has proposed “requiring that 
dates on medical device labels conform to a standard format consistent with 
international standards and international practice” in order to streamline 
U.S. and international medical device labels.3 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has adopted safety 
standards that “provide consistency between domestic and international 
efforts for security of radioactive materials that are deemed to be attractive 
targets for malevolent use.”4 
The Department of Labor has proposed that the labeling of hazardous 
chemicals in workplaces must “conform with” a recommended 
classification system set by the United Nations.5 
The internationalization of agency actions is due, in large part, to the 
growing number of regulatory issues that demand international cooperation 
and coordination in our globalized age.6  In 2012, international cooperation 
received a boost from President Obama’s landmark Executive Order 
 
 1. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED STANDARDS OF 
PERFORMANCE FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FOR NEW STATIONARY SOURCES:  ELECTRIC 
UTILITY GENERATING UNITS (2013), http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-
09/documents/20130920proposalria.pdf. 
 2. Regulatory Capital Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 62,018, 62,022 (Oct. 11, 2013). 
 3. Unique Device Identification System, 78 Fed. Reg. 58,786, 58,787 (Sept. 24, 2013). 
 4. Physical Protection of Byproduct Material, 78 Fed. Reg. 16,922, 16,926 (Mar. 19, 
2013). 
 5. Hazard Communication, 74 Fed. Reg. 50,280 (Sept. 30, 2009). 
 6. See David Zaring, Sovereignty Mismatch and the New Administrative Law, 91 
WASH. U. L. REV. 59, 69 (2013). 
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13,609, which tasks agencies with considering the “international impacts” 
of significant rulemakings and pursuing “international regulatory 
cooperation” when addressing shared regulatory issues.7  As a result, we 
can expect this internationalization trend to continue and gain in 
prominence. 
This Article examines what the internationalization of agency actions 
means for agency decision-making processes, institutional design, and legal 
doctrine.  In doing so, this Article makes several descriptive and normative 
claims that contribute to several strands and fields of legal scholarship. 
First, the Article contributes to traditional administrative law doctrine by 
offering a clearer understanding of when agencies can rely on international 
considerations to justify their actions in court.  This Article develops a 
taxonomy of international factors relied on by agencies and scours the case 
law to determine which factors courts presumptively allow agencies to 
consider in the absence of express congressional authorization.8  I then 
apply these findings to offer a fresh interpretation of the U.S. Supreme 
Court opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA.9  While some have read this case as 
prohibiting agencies from invoking foreign policy considerations to justify 
their actions,10 I suggest a narrower reading that only prohibits agencies 
from relying on one type of foreign policy consideration identified in the 
taxonomy—namely, agencies cannot base their actions on the effects they 
have on international negotiations.11  Even here, though, I suggest that such 
effects may be considered if the regulatory agency consults with the 
Department of State or other diplomatic experts.12  Not only would this 
reading of Massachusetts v. EPA allow agencies to invoke a broader range 
of foreign policy rationales generally, it would have the immediate and 
specific effect of making it more likely that a court will accept as legitimate 
the foreign policy considerations underlying the EPA’s recent action on 
climate change. 
Second, this Article contributes significantly to the global administrative 
law literature.  Global administrative law focuses on the processes, 
procedures, and substantive outcomes of international regulatory regimes.13  
 
 7. Exec. Order No. 13,609, 77 Fed. Reg. 26,413, 26,414 (May 1, 2012).  This 
Executive Order is the first presidential executive order that tasks agencies with international 
regulatory cooperation, a recommendation first made in 1991, see Recommendations of the 
Administrative Conference Regarding Administrative Practice and Procedure, 56 Fed. Reg. 
33,841 (July 24, 1991), but not effected until nearly twenty-one years later, see Press 
Release, Executive Order Signed Based on Administrative Conference Recommendation 
(May 9, 2012), available at http://www.acus.gov/newsroom/news/executive-order-signed-
based-administrative-conference-recommendation. 
 8. See infra Parts I, III. 
 9. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 10. See infra Part III.C. 
 11. See infra Part III.C. 
 12. See infra Part III.C. 
 13. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale:  Globalizing 
Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490 (2006); David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 294, 318–320 (2006); David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in 
International Administration, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 547 (2005) [hereinafter Zaring, Informal]. 
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The subfield was launched because traditional administrative law paradigms 
were formed with domestic law in mind and could not account for 
international developments.14  To the extent that the subfield has focused on 
the domestic level, it has typically been either to assess how U.S. 
administrative law can inform international administrative practices15 or to 
show how international regulatory regimes affect substantive decision 
making by domestic agencies.16 
This Article engages in an institutional analysis that shows how the 
causal chain runs in the other direction too—that is, domestic administrative 
law can affect substantive decision making at the international level.17  For 
example, in several opinions, courts have refused to exercise jurisdiction 
over some agency decisions that involve the negotiation and 
implementation of international agreements coordinating foreign and U.S. 
regulations.18  One effect of these opinions is to give the executive branch a 
freer hand to bargain with other nations and not worry that courts will veto 
the international arrangements.  But at the same time these judicial 
decisions undermine the executive’s bargaining power because they make it 
harder for the executive to credibly claim that any agreement must align 
more closely with U.S. values and preferences or risk being overturned in 
U.S. courts. 
Third, this Article contributes to the international law and international 
affairs literature on costly signaling theory.19  This theory explains how, in 
the midst of international negotiations, state actors behave in ways that send 
signals of their foreign policy intentions to other nations, which observe the 
signals and adjust their negotiating positions accordingly.20  The literature 
has focused on signals sent through actions by Congress and the President.  
This Article shows how such signals are now being sent through agency 
actions.  The most recent example comes from the EPA’s proposal to 
regulate climate change in part because of the “leadership” that it would 
demonstrate globally.21 
 
 14. See Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005). 
 15. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law:  A Model for Global 
Administrative Law?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (2005). 
 16. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Global Regulatory Challenge to U.S. 
Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 695 (2005); Joel P. Trachtman, 
International Legal Control of Domestic Administrative Action (Feb. 19, 2014), 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=joel_trachtman. 
 17. See infra Part II.B. 
 18. See infra Part II.B. 
 19. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2005); ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS:  A RATIONAL CHOICE 
THEORY (2008); Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy:  An 
Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229 
(2004); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999); Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:  An 
Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469 (2005); Kal Raustiala, Form 
and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 581 (2005). 
 20. See infra Part I.D. 
 21. See EPA, supra note 1. 
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Finally, this Article contributes incidentally to the federalism literature.  
Some scholars have argued against the federal preemption of state law on 
the grounds that preemption blocks policymaking at the state level and thus 
deprives federal policymakers of a valuable source of information about 
which policies work best.22  Without state policy experiments, the argument 
goes, federal policymakers such as agencies will have a harder time 
identifying the optimal policy.23  This Article shows that this argument 
against preemption has far less purchase in today’s globalized world.  U.S. 
agencies and their foreign counterparts often face similar problems.24  As a 
result, when state-level regulations are preempted or otherwise nonexistent, 
U.S. agencies can still learn by looking to policies enacted overseas. 
This Article proceeds as follow.  Part I provides a taxonomy of the 
international factors that agencies consider when taking regulatory action.  
Part II examines a common dilemma faced by agencies:  whether to 
coordinate their standards with international or foreign regulators.  This part 
creates a stylized model of agency decision making under this dilemma.  It 
then discusses how domestic institutions can be designed to make it more 
likely that agencies will engage in beneficial coordination with foreign 
regulators or that such coordination will align with U.S. preferences.  This 
part shows that there is a trade-off between international coordination and 
the U.S. agency’s bargaining advantage.  Domestic institutional designs that 
make coordination more likely simultaneously reduce U.S. agencies’ 
bargaining power over their foreign counterparts.  Part III discusses the 
current doctrine on whether agencies can rely on international factors to 
support their actions in court.  It suggests narrow readings of Massachusetts 
v. EPA that keep intact a presumption developed by the D.C. Circuit that 
agencies can rely on such factors, even in the absence of express 
congressional authorization.   
I.   A TAXONOMY OF AGENCIES’ INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This part provides a taxonomy of the international considerations relied 
on by agencies.  I divide these considerations into four main types:  
(A) international network effects, (B) international regulatory spillover 
effects, (C) international epistemic factors, and (D) foreign affairs factors.  
Each type is discussed in a section below.  The taxonomy is designed to 
improve the understanding of agency decision making regarding 
international concerns generally.  Identifying different types of international 
considerations also produces a couple of interesting specific findings.  It 
shows that regulatory agencies are now engaging in the sort of costly 
signals of foreign policy intent that have typically been ascribed to the 
President and Congress, and it shows that agencies look to foreign 
 
 22. See, e.g., Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480 
(2008). 
 23. See id. 
 24. See supra Part I.C. 
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regulations as potential models in ways that complement how agencies 
sometimes look to state-level regulations for guidance. 
A.   International Network Effects 
When U.S. regulators and their foreign counterparts adopt the same 
standard, this consistency produces efficiencies known as network effects.25  
The potential to generate network effects often leads agencies to consider 
whether they should coordinate their regulations with foreign standards. 
This section discuses several types of benefits from network effects—
gains in international trade, reduced compliance and reporting costs for 
firms, and reduced information and enforcement costs for agencies—and 
illustrates how agencies consider these benefits. 
1.   Network Effects and Gains from International Trade 
Gains from international trade are probably the most common network 
effect considered by agencies.26  When U.S. and foreign regulations are 
harmonized, it makes it easier to import and export goods among the 
nations because manufacturers can make one product that satisfies the 
multiple nations’ regulations.  U.S. agencies often invoke this kind of 
improved trading opportunity as a benefit of their policy choice.27  For 
example, when the Department of Transportation promulgated a rule for 
hydraulic brakes, it noted that its standards were the same as European 
specifications and explained:  “This will enable manufacturers to build 
vehicles with standardized brake systems acceptable throughout the world, 
thereby providing significant cost savings to vehicle buyers . . . and thereby 
dismantl[ing] one of the most significant non-tariff barriers to international 
motor vehicle trade.”28 
Network effects leading to gains from trade are also generated when a 
U.S. agency makes a finding that a foreign standard is of equivalent or 
compatible stringency and thus compliance with the foreign standard will 
be deemed sufficient to satisfy the U.S. standard.  Equivalency 
determinations are often made as part of mutual recognition agreements in 
which the U.S. and another nation agree that if a product or service meets 
regulatory requirements in one jurisdiction, it then satisfies the 
requirements of the other jurisdiction.29  For example, the FDA has 
 
 25. See George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 
99 AM. J. INT’L L. 541, 567 n.117 (2005) (explaining that network effects “arise simply from 
efficiencies due to consistency of arrangements”). 
 26. I have no strong empirical support for this proposition.  It is merely my sense from 
having read and searched through dozens of proposed and final rulemakings that purport to 
rely on some international or foreign factor. 
 27. See, e.g., Pesticide Tolerance Grouping Program II, 75 Fed. Reg. 76,284, 76,288 
(Dec. 8, 2010). 
 28. Federal Motor Safety Standards, 60 Fed. Reg. 6411, 6413 (Feb. 2, 1995). 
 29. See Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition 
Regimes:  Governance Without Global Government, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 274–
75, 290 (2005). 
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agreements with regulators in Canada that require each nation to accept the 
other’s results from inspections for compliance with good manufacturing 
practices.30  In effect, each nation’s regulators have agreed to deputize the 
other nation’s regulators to act on their behalf.  The outcome is that firms 
with operations in each country can comply with their home nation’s 
standards and at the same time satisfy regulators in the other nation. 
Equivalency determinations can also occur on an ad hoc basis as 
regulated entities push U.S. agencies to find that compliance with another 
nation’s regulations will satisfy the agency’s own standards.31  For 
example, car manufacturers often ask the Department of Transportation to 
determine that various European standards are “functionally equivalent” 
with U.S. standards.32  The carmakers lobby the agency for this finding 
because they want to be able to sell cars in both American and European 
markets without having to change safety specifications. 
2.   Network Effects and Compliance and Reporting Costs 
Adopting consistent standards can also produce regulatory benefits by 
reducing the resources that regulated firms must devote to compliance and 
reporting.  Firms operating in multiple jurisdictions are often subject to 
conflicting requirements that require compiling unique sets of information 
for each jurisdiction.33  However, if these jurisdictions coordinate their 
requirements, the firms can avoid this burdensome work.34 
The FDA used this logic to support its proposal to adopt safety reporting 
requirements recommended by an international regulatory body, noting:  
“Savings to the affected industry would accrue from more efficient 
allocation of resources resulting from international harmonization of the 
safety reporting requirements.”35  Similarly, to reduce reporting costs 
through uniform standards, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
developed a “multijurisdictional disclosure system” that allows Canadian 
issuers of securities to meet U.S. disclosure requirements “by providing 
 
 30. See Linda Horton, Mutual Recognition Agreements and Harmonization, 29 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 692, 722 n.139 (1998). 
 31. See Nicolaidis & Shaffer, supra note 29, at 283 (noting that equivalency findings are 
often the product of pressure from business interests). 
 32. See, e.g., Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 65 Fed. Reg. 33,508 (May 24, 
2000). 
 33. See Philip J. McConnaughay, Reviving the “Public Law Taboo” in International 
Conflict of Laws, 35 STAN. J. INT’L L. 255, 289 (1999) (noting that conflicting oversight of 
businesses by different nations can produce “multiple, concurrent regulation of any given 
international transaction”). 
 34. The same basic issue arises when firms are subject to oversight by multiple federal 
agencies with overlapping jurisdiction.  If these agencies adopt conflicting rules, it increases 
reporting requirements for firms.  Interagency coordination among the federal agencies can 
help reduce these costs. See Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 
181, 200–01, 223 (2011) (discussing the “burdens on regulated entities that must comply 
with two agencies’ regulations”). 
 35. Safety Reporting Requirements for Human Drug and Biological Products, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 74,112 (Dec. 9, 2002). 
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disclosure documents prepared in accordance with the requirements of 
Canadian regulatory authorities.”36 
3.   Network Effects and Information and Enforcement Costs 
Coordination with foreign regulations can also generate network effects 
that save resources for the agencies themselves.  As more nations adhere to 
a similar regulatory standard, it becomes increasingly valuable for U.S. 
agencies to adopt the same standard because they can reap the benefits of 
information-sharing and joint enforcement among the similarly situated 
foreign regulators.37  As Kal Raustiala has explained:  “[N]etwork effects 
boost the existing incentives to standardize.”38  Thus, if SEC and Federal 
Reserve Bank regulators are interested in creating a common standard with 
other jurisdictions, these organizations can serve as the fora in which such a 
standard is hammered out.39  Whatever standard is chosen has a good 
chance of developing an adoptive momentum by virtue of the advantages 
regulators see in being a part of the “network” of regulators applying the 
same schema to their regulated industry.40 
Capitalizing on this kind of network effect was one reason why the EPA 
aligned its crop classification system with European standards.41  As the 
EPA explained, harmonizing classifications “increased potential for 
resource sharing between EPA and pesticide regulatory agencies in other 
countries.”42  These resource savings can indirectly benefit the public 
because less money must be drawn from the U.S. Treasury for the agency to 
do its job, but the benefit first and foremost redounds to the agency, which 
immediately has more resources to devote to its other regulatory tasks.43 
B.   International Regulatory Spillover Effects 
Regulatory spillover effects exist whenever one nation’s regulations 
substantially affect the well-being of another nation’s population.44  This 
section first explains how spillover effects occur.  It then illustrates how 
 
 36. Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the Current Registration and 
Reporting System for Canadian Issuers, 55 Fed. Reg. 46,288 (Nov. 2, 1990). 
 37. See Zaring, Informal, supra note 13, at 591–92; see also Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, 
The Mismatch Between State Power and State Capacity in Transnational Law Enforcement, 
22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 15, 28–29 (2004) (describing how information and enforcement 
costs lead to problems in international coordination among law enforcement agencies). 
 38. Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation:  Transgovernmental 
Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 65 (2002). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Pesticide Tolerance Crop Grouping Program II, 75 Fed. Reg. 76,284, 76,288 (Dec. 8, 
2010). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Jason Marisam, The Interagency Marketplace, 96 MINN. L. REV. 886, 941–42 
(2012) (explaining how, when an agency saves resources from one task, “the agency has 
extra money to spend on something else”). 
 44. Cf. Joel P. Trachtman, Trade and . . . Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and 
Subsidiarity, 9 EURO. J. INT’L L. 32, 34 (1998) (“[T]here are horizontal spillovers that cause 
one group to be affected by the legal rules and policy decisions of another group.”). 
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U.S. agencies take these effects into account by independently assessing 
how their actions affect other nations and also how their actions could 
protect the United States from spillover effects originating in other nations. 
1.   How Spillover Effects Occur 
Many spillover effects occur because one nation’s regulations are set at 
levels that do not adequately protect global public and common goods, such 
as clean air, fisheries populations, and stable banking systems.45  If one 
nation has lax pollution standards, people breathing in other nations can 
suffer.  If one nation allows voluminous fishing off its shores, the fish 
stocks available for other nations will also be depleted.  If one nation allows 
its banks to take on excessive risk without adequate capital reserves, the 
banks’ weaknesses can cause a chain of bad consequences that reaches 
other nations’ banking systems.46  The problem from a governance 
perspective is that nations have incentives to maintain inadequate 
regulations that produce these kinds of risks because nations must absorb 
the cost of enacting and enforcing their own stringent regulations, but they 
only capture a fraction of the benefits, which are spread among all the 
nations that enjoy the global public and common goods.47 
Spillover effects are also generated by regulatory arbitrage.  Professor 
Victor Fleisher has recently defined regulatory arbitrage as “the 
manipulation of the structure of a deal to take advantage of a gap between 
the economic substance of a transaction and its regulatory treatment.”48  
One key type of regulatory arbitrage arises when regulators in different 
jurisdictions address the same subject matter differently.  This 
inconsistency can give regulated actors the ability to choose which 
regulatory regime they prefer and then locate or relocate their actions in that 
jurisdiction.  The outcome of this gamesmanship can be inefficient because 
firms are likely to choose a jurisdiction with insufficiently stringent 
regulations.  Again, though, there is a governance problem because 
individual nations have incentives to weaken their regulations to attract 
individual businesses to their jurisdictions.  These nations then reap much 
of the wealth-generating benefits of having such businesses, while much of 
the risk spills over to other nations. 
 
 45. See Gregory Shaffer, International Law and Global Public Goods in a Legal 
Pluralist World, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 669 (2012). 
 46. Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 198–200 (2008). 
 47. Cf. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 93–94 
(1997) (“Because producers of biodiversity—that is, owners of land producing 
biodiversity—capture at best only a small fraction of its benefits, no one has an adequate 
incentive to produce that good in socially optimal quantities.”). 
 48. Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 230 (2001); see also 
Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 
211, 211 n.1 (1997) (“‘Regulatory arbitrage’ refers to financial transactions designed to 
reduce costs or capture profit opportunities created by differential regulations or laws.”). 
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2.   Independently Assessing U.S.-Based Spillover Effects 
U.S. agencies sometimes take into account spillover effects by 
independently assessing how their regulations affect other nations.  They 
often do so for political reasons.  By considering how their regulations 
affect others, the U.S. agencies signal that they are not selfish actors but are 
willing to cooperate in the protection of some global good.  For example, 
when the Federal Trade Commission was considering whether to license the 
sale of nuclear material to another nation, it assessed the impact on the 
“global commons”—that is, it considered how radiation leaks from the 
nuclear material would affect global public health and the environment.49  
The agency seemed to make the assessment because it was in the United 
States’ interests to be seen as cooperating with international efforts to 
responsibly manage the proliferation of nuclear material.50 
Other times, these assessments are made because the agency has a legal 
obligation to consider transnational harms.  For example, the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires a federal agency “to the fullest 
extent possible” to prepare “a detailed statement on . . . the environmental 
impact” of “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment.”51  A federal court has interpreted these provisions to 
require the Department of Transportation to consider how its domestic 
regulation of fuel efficiency standards for automobiles affects climate 
change.52  The agency had argued to the court that it should not have to 
assess climate change impacts precisely because “climate change is largely 
a global phenomenon that includes actions that are outside of [the agency’s] 
control.”53  However, the court held that the global nature “does not release 
the agency from the duty of assessing the effects of its actions on global 
warming within the context of other actions that also affect global 
warming.”54  That is, to the extent that the agency’s regulatory standards 
affected a global public good like the climate, the agency had to assess that 
impact per Congress’s instruction in NEPA. 
 
 49. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 647 F.2d 1345, 
1365–66 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 50. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 51. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i) (2012). 
 52. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic and Safety Admin., 538 
F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 53. Id. at 1217.  Professor Kevin Stack refers to this kind of argument as the “one 
percent problem” because it involves actors deflecting responsibility for a problem by 
arguing that they are only contributing a small amount to the problem. Kevin Stack & 
Michael P. Vadenbergh, The One Percent Problem, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1385 (2011). 
 54. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d at 1217.  Agencies may be expressly 
forbidden from considering such effects, too.  For example, a federal court held that the 
Department of the Interior must consider the local environmental impacts of its regulations 
on offshore oil operations but that it was barred from considering the international or global 
impacts because, when Congress passed the agency’s enabling statute, it was only concerned 
with local effects. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Dep’t of the Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 484–
85 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
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3.   Protecting the United States from Other Nations’ Spillover Effects 
When regulatory agencies independently assess their own spillover 
effects, such considerations help protect other nations from U.S. regulatory 
behavior, but they do not necessarily help protect U.S. citizens from other 
nations’ spillover effects.  To limit these harms, agencies must convince 
other nations to address their spillover effects.  How can they do that?  A 
common approach is to reinforce or help form an international arrangement 
whereby multiple nations adhere to common minimum standards that 
reduce the spillover effects created by lax regulation.55  As Professor Ilan 
Benshalom puts it, “Given their inability to satisfactorily govern complex 
global issues by themselves, states have an incentive to better manage these 
issues by coordinating their actions.”56  A recent example of this is the 
agreement between China and the United States regarding climate change.  
Announced by President Obama and President Xi Jinping on November 11, 
2014, the two nations outlined a joint plan to curb carbon emissions, which 
includes new carbon emissions reductions by the United States and a “first-
ever commitment by China to stop its emissions from growing by 2030.”57  
Not only does the agreement allow the United States to limit the spillover 
effects from China, but the coordinated effort between the two nations acts 
to encourage other countries to make their own cuts in carbon emissions.58 
The United States can help maintain such spillover-minimizing 
arrangements by adhering to existing international arrangements and thus 
encouraging others to do the same.  When the United States agrees to enter 
into an internationally coordinated agreement, other nations are likely to 
follow for a couple of reasons.  First, when increasing numbers of nations 
agree to a common international standard, other nations may fear that they 
will be punished or their reputation may suffer if they do not join.59  This 
risk is particularly great when dominant nations such as the United States 
are the ones pushing for international coordination.  Second, the 
comparative costs of joining a coordinated arrangement decrease as more 
nations adhere to that standard.  If we assume that there is some resource 
cost to joining an international arrangement because it entails maintaining 
stricter regulations, some nations may balk at absorbing these costs because 
they do not want to expend resources that other nations are saving by not 
joining the arrangement.  This concern about comparative resource savings 
 
 55. See Raustiala, supra note 38, at 27 (“[I]n the area of environmental protection, the 
public goods nature of many environmental problems prompts states to negotiate collective, 
often universal treaties that fit the liberal internationalist model well.”). 
 56. Ilan Benshalom, Rethinking International Distributive Justice:  Fairness As 
Insurance, 31 B.U. INT’L L.J. 267, 275 (2013). 
 57. Mark Landler, U.S. and China Reach Climate Accord After Months of Talks, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2014, at A1; see also Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The 
White House, Fact Sheet:  U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change and Clean 
Energy Cooperation (Nov. 11, 2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/11/11/fact-sheet-us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change-and-clean-
energy-c. 
 58. Landler, supra note 57. 
 59. See Benshalom, supra note 56, at 292 n.142. 
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diminishes as more nations expend the resources needed to abide by the 
international arrangement.60 
This logic helps explain why U.S. agencies often abide by recommended 
international standards governing spillover effects that they are under no 
legal obligation to adopt.  For example, spillover effects are generated when 
individual nations do not adequately secure their nuclear material, creating 
a risk that the material may be captured by terrorists and used in attacks 
around the world.  To minimize this risk, the United Nations has established 
a voluntary framework that sets minimum security standards for different 
types of radioactive material.61  The United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission has opted to adhere to this standard, thus creating support for 
the norm and potentially making it more likely that other nations will do the 
same.62  As more nations abide by the norm, the United States itself is 
increasingly protected from the risk of misused, stolen radioactive material. 
When no spillover-minimizing arrangement exists, U.S. agencies can 
play a role in the formation of one.  Consider the SEC’s recent attempts to 
regulate security-based swaps, which are complex financial transactions 
that involve two parties agreeing to exchange payments contingent on 
events such as changes in stock prices or interest rates.63  Such swaps, if not 
properly regulated, can cause great harm to the global financial system.64  
Yet, only a few nations have enacted regulations for the swaps.  The lack of 
regulation in other nations could produce problems for the United States if 
poorly constructed swap deals made in those nations generate risks that spill 
into U.S. markets.  To reduce this risk, the SEC “is in discussions with its 
foreign counterparts to explore steps toward harmonizing standards for such 
regulation in the future.”65 
C.   International Epistemic Factors 
Agencies also look to foreign regulations for epistemic benefits—that is, 
for what the agencies can learn about the workability of different regulatory 
standards.  This section first illustrates how agencies look to foreign 
regulations for guidance.  It then examines how United States reliance on 
foreign policies complements federal reliance on state-level policies.  One 
implication of this discussion is that arguments against the federal 
 
 60. See id. 
 61. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, International Safeguards, NRC.GOV (Nov. 3, 
2014), http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/ip/intl-safeguards.html. 
 62. Physical Protection of Byproduct Material, 78 Fed. Reg. 16,922, 16,925 (Mar. 19, 
2013). 
 63. Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. 30,968 (Mar. 19, 2013). 
 64. See, e.g., Yesha Yadav, The Problematic Case of Clearinghouses in Complex 
Markets, 101 GEO. L.J. 387, 444 (2013). 
 65. Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,056; see also Eric 
C. Chaffee, The Internationalization of Securities Regulation:  The United States 
Government’s Role in Regulating the Global Capital Markets, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 187, 191 
(2010) (“Unless harmonization and centralization of international securities law occurs, this 
race to the bottom will continue, and more financial crises will ensue.”). 
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preemption of state law have less force when foreign policies are available 
as models. 
1.   Foreign Regulation As Guidance for U.S. Regulation 
If foreign regulations have worked well to solve a regulatory problem, 
this success can spur U.S. agencies to consider whether similar approaches 
are desirable here.66  For example, in 2009, the European Union adopted 
regulations governing the transparency of retail roaming charges incurred 
by European wireless customers.  Its immediate success in Europe led the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) “to gather information on the 
feasibility of instituting usage alerts and cut-off mechanisms similar to 
those required under the European Union (EU) regulations.”67  Without the 
European experience, the FCC probably would not have pursued this 
regulatory effort. 
Aside from looking to other nations for evidence of what they should be 
doing, U.S. agencies also look to those nations to see what they need not 
enact.  The logic seems to be that the absence of a particular regulatory 
feature in other comparably developed nations can serve as evidence that 
such a feature is not a necessary part of a modern, legitimate regulatory 
scheme that adequately protects the public from risks.  For example, the 
Department of Transportation justified its decision “not to require head 
restraints in rear outboard designated seating positions” in part by pointing 
out that European regulations were likewise lacking these head restraint 
standards.68  The lack of regulations in a rich, comparatively consumer-
friendly jurisdiction like Europe made it easier for the agency to argue that 
it was not shirking its public duties by not having such regulations either. 
2.   Foreign Regulations As Replacements for State Regulations 
The federalism literature has long recognized that policy variation among 
states is valuable because the federal government can observe the various 
policies, determine which ones work best, and adapt them at the federal 
level.69  But states are often unlikely to experiment with different policies.70  
In these instances, foreign regulations can fill the gap. 
 
 66. Looking to foreign decisions can be problematic if the U.S. agency free rides off of 
the foreign agency’s efforts and simply mimics its decision without doing any individual 
assessment of the options. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, 
and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 486 (2002).  But if the 
agencies avoid the temptation to engage in pure epistemic free riding, they can benefit by 
looking to the foreign experience of selecting and implementing a standard as evidence of 
that standard’s plausibility and practicability. 
 67. Measures Designed to Assist U.S. Wireless Consumers to Avoid “Bill Shock,” 75 
Fed. Reg. 28,249 (May 20, 2010). 
 68. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 69 Fed. Reg. 74,848 (Dec. 14, 2004). 
 69. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).  For a discussion of this rationale in 
legal scholarship, see Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States:  Federalism and 
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Consider that states often fail to regulate risks that have significant global 
impacts because the harms from such risks reach far beyond one state’s 
borders and thus each individual state has little incentive to absorb the cost 
of regulating the risk on its own.71  When this problem occurs, federal 
agencies can still look to foreign and international regulators for guidance.  
For example, states have little incentive to invest resources in developing 
robust methodologies for measuring how emissions impact climate change 
because climate change is a global problem.  As a result, when the EPA 
searched for such a methodology, it did not look to the states but to the 
United Nations.72 
States are also sometimes unable to regulate because state action is 
preempted by federal law.73  Federal preemption is most often justified by 
the benefits of having a uniform national standard instead of a patchwork of 
different states’ standards that can increase the costs of doing business 
nationwide.  When preemption occurs, though, the states have no law that 
can serve as guidance for U.S. agencies.  But U.S. agencies can still look 
overseas.  Consider the example of automobile regulation.  In order to 
ensure a national market for cars, many state-level automobile safety 
standards are preempted by federal law.74  As a result, the Department of 
Transportation cannot look to state policies for guidance when crafting 
automobile safety standards, but the agency routinely looks to foreign 
regulations and has recently implemented European safety standards.75 
This last point has significant normative implications.  Some have argued 
against federal preemption because it deprives federal policymakers of the 
ability to learn by observing policy variation at the state level.76  But this 
 
Constitutional Rights, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1750–76 (2004); Roberta Romano, The 
States As a Laboratory:  Legal Innovation and State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 
YALE J. ON REG. 209, 246 (2005). 
 70. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection:  Does Federalism Promote 
Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 615 (1980) (stating that federalism produces only “weak 
effects” in promoting innovation); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism:  Some 
Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 925 (1994) (“[I]ndividual states will 
have no incentive to invest in experiments that involve any substantive or political risk.”). 
 71. Cf. Michael Abramowicz et al., Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 977 
(2011) (“When a policy targets individual incentives and has no ‘externalities’—effects that 
extend beyond an individual—then the treatment should be randomly assigned at the 
individual level.”). 
 72. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under 
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009). 
 73. For a discussion of the arguments for and against regulatory preemption law and 
policy, see generally THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR:  WHEN FEDERAL 
BUREAUCRACIES TRUMP LOCAL JURIES (2008); Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability 
Preemption:  An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449 (2008).  For recent 
Supreme Court decisions, see Brueswitz v. Wyeth, 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011); Wyeth v. Levine, 
555 U.S. 555 (2009); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008). 
 74. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 881 (2000). 
 75. See, e.g., Anthropomorphic Test Devices, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,304, 75,305 (Dec. 14, 
2006). 
 76. See Listokin, supra note 22, at 551 (arguing that preemption “comes at a significant 
cost—the elimination of information-producing policy variance that improves long-run 
policy outcomes”); Nim Razook, A Contract-Enhancing Norm Limiting Federal Preemption 
of Presumptively State Domains, 11 BYU J. PUB. L. 163 (1997) (arguing that state 
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argument has less force when international policies can generate similar 
information.  In these instances, federal lawmakers and regulators can 
capture the benefits of preemption—namely national uniformity—while 
still being able to learn through policy variation.  Of course, sometimes 
foreign regulations will provide imperfect models because of cultural 
differences among the nations.77  But while such differences can be 
problematic, it should not be assumed that it is more difficult for agencies 
to borrow from their foreign counterparts than their state-level counterparts.  
Indeed, federal agencies may have an easier time adapting a foreign 
regulation from a large nation facing a similar problem than scaling up a 
state-level regulation that was originally designed to meet local needs. 
In sum, foreign regulations often provide useful information about what 
kinds of regulations may work to solve regulatory problems in the United 
States.  Foreign regulations are particularly valuable models for federal 
agencies when state-level regulations are unavailable or inapplicable. 
D.   Foreign Affairs Factors 
Regulatory agencies also consider the kinds of foreign affairs factors that 
have traditionally been the bailiwick of diplomats and international lawyers.  
This section discusses how regulatory agencies consider a host of foreign 
affairs factors including:  binding international law, international reputation 
and relationships, the response of foreign nations to agency actions, and the 
affect on international negotiations. 
1.   Binding International Law 
Binding international law is perhaps the most straightforward of these 
factors.78  Under various conventions and treaties, the United States is 
obligated to take certain actions or suffer some punishment.79  The United 
States’ treaty obligations may either be self-executing, that is to say they 
may be immediately enforced,80 or non-self-executing, which would require 
 
experimentation is usually preferable to federal preemption for traditionally state-governed 
areas such as product liability law in part because of the value of experimentation). 
 77. One concern with looking to policies made in foreign nations instead of American 
states is that “differences between nations are so great that one cannot infer the effects of a 
variation in Country X will be similar to the effects of the same variation in Country Y.” 
Listokin, supra note 22, at 549 n.184. 
 78. See Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law:  Alternatives, 
Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 707–08 
(2010) (explaining the difference between hard international law—that may entail binding 
legal obligations—and soft international law—which does not produce litigation or direct 
legal sanction but may still affect state behavior through its effect on norms and state 
identities). 
 79. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1115 U.N.T.S. 
331; Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (providing that if a nation fails to enforce 
its treaty obligations, “its infraction becomes the subject of international negotiations and 
reclamations, so far as the injured party chooses to seek redress, which may in the end be 
enforced by actual war”). 
 80. See Edye, 112 U.S. at 598–99. 
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Congress to pass an implementing statute to enforce the treaty.81  The desire 
to meet these obligations drives many regulatory actions.  For example, 
under the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, a U.N. 
Convention, the United States must match certain emission standards for 
aircrafts or else other nations can sanction the United States by banning its 
airplanes from traveling though their airspace.82  In part to avoid this 
sanction, the EPA updates its emissions standards to meet the international 
standard.83 
International law can also affect the procedures through which agencies 
act.  For example, the United States is party to World Trade Organization 
(WTO) agreements that require nations to employ certain procedures when 
setting trade standards.84  When the United States Trade Representative 
enacts rules, it must ensure it follows these procedures.85 
2.   International Reputation and Relationships 
Softer foreign affairs factors such as international reputation and 
international relationships also enter into regulatory agencies’ decision-
making calculus.  Reputation is particularly important for agencies that are 
part of informal intergovernmental networks of regulators that deal with 
similar regulatory problems in their respective jurisdictions.  These 
networks lack the formal binding structure of a treaty.  Instead, the 
members are bound through relationships and trust.86  If an agency wants to 
maintain its membership in an informal network and reap the cooperative 
benefits from such membership, it must demonstrate its trustworthiness.87  
For example, the Federal Reserve is a member of the Basel Committee, an 
informal network of international regulators that recommends banking 
standards.88  If the U.S. banking agency were to ignore the Committee’s 
 
 81. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829), overruled on other grounds 
by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833). 
 82. See Nat’l Ass’n of Clean Air Agencies v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1221, 1224–25 (D.C. Cir. 
2007). 
 83. Id. 
 84. See, e.g., Trade Agreements Act of 1979 § 2(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2503(a) (2012). 
 85. Submission of Representations Concerning Standards-Related Activity, 47 Fed. Reg. 
50,207 (Nov. 5, 1982) (enacting regulations that “provide for the proper submission of 
representations by certain foreign countries concerning standards-related activities viewed 
by such countries as barriers to trade” as required by WTO agreements). 
 86. See Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. 
REV. 117, 161–62 (2007) (“Foreign regulators and nongovernmental organizations also play 
influential roles as evangelists and watchdogs of agency professionalism, diligence, and 
fidelity.”). 
 87. As Anne-Marie Slaughter has observed, these kinds of networks give agencies “an 
incentive ‘to maintain their reputation in the eyes of other members of the network.’” ANNE-
MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 55 (2004) (quoting Giandomenico Majone, The 
New European Agencies:  Regulation by Information, 4 J. ENVTL. PUB. POL’Y 262, 272 
(1997)). 
 88. See Charles K. Whitehead, What’s Your Sign?  International Norms, Signals, and 
Compliance, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 695, 710 (2006) (describing the Board as a “driving force” 
on the Basel Committee). 
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core recommendations, it would jeopardize its standing in the group.89  As a 
result, the agency tends to enact the core recommendations domestically.90 
3.   Foreign Responses to Agency Actions 
Another foreign policy consideration concerns whether and how foreign 
nations will respond to an agency action.  A regulation seen as cooperative 
may be reciprocated with a cooperative regulation that has benefits for the 
United States.  The clearest example of this consideration comes from a 
2006 Department of Transportation proposal to allow foreign investors in 
U.S. airlines to engage in commercial decision making at the airlines if the 
United States has an agreement with the foreign investor’s home country 
that permits reciprocal investment opportunities in its national air carriers 
for U.S. investors.91  In proposing the rule, the agency observed that 
“European Union negotiators have made it clear that the European Union 
will consider the outcome of this proceeding in determining whether it will” 
allow U.S. investment in European airlines.92  In other words, if the 
Department of Transportation made it easier for Europeans to invest in and 
control U.S. airlines, the Europeans would likely do the same for 
Americans.93 
By contrast, a regulation that is seen as uncooperative could be met with 
an antagonistic response by foreign regulators.  For example, it has been 
suggested that the Federal Reserve’s proposed rule to heighten capital 
requirements for foreign banks could trigger a tit-for-tat response by foreign 
regulators who would ratchet up their regulation of American banks 
operating on their turf.94  As the New York Times hinted:  “One looming 
question is whether the Europeans will retaliate against the new rules once 
they go into effect—and force American banks to lock up capital at their 
 
 89. This would entail significant costs, as some of the most important banking rules are 
crafted by the Basel Committee. See Brett McDonnell, Don’t Panic!  Defending Cowardly 
Interventions During and After a Financial Crisis, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 53–54 (2011) 
(“In the area of capital requirements, the most important rulemaking is occurring at the 
international level, as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision moves to finalize the 
Basel III Accords.”). 
 90. See Maximillian L. Feldman, Note, The Domestic Implementation of International 
Regulations, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 401, 410 (2013) (observing that the Federal Reserve Board 
was, for certain provisions of the Accord, “so strongly committed to an international 
regulation that it disregards contrary public comments and implements the international 
regulation domestically”). 
 91. Airworthiness Directives, 71 Fed. Reg. 26,425 (May 5, 2006). 
 92. Id.  However, the agency insisted that it was not proposing the rule in order to secure 
agreements with the European Union. Id. 
 93. Interestingly, state policymakers are not allowed to make similar calculations 
concerning whether other states would reciprocate cooperative behavior. See Great A&P Tea 
Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976) (invalidating a Mississippi law that required that milk 
could be shipped into Mississippi from other states only if the other state would reciprocate 
by accepting milk from Mississippi). 
 94. Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for Foreign 
Banking Organizations and Foreign Nonbank Financial Companies, 77 Fed. Reg. 76,628 
(Dec. 28, 2012). 
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operations overseas.”95  The agency is likely aware of this possibility and 
has considered it as part of the decision-making process. 
4.   Effects on International Negotiations 
The last type of foreign affairs factor concerns the signal that the agency 
action sends to other nations about the United States’ negotiating position 
on an international matter.  Presidents and Congress have long been 
understood to use their powers to signal U.S. foreign policy intentions to 
other nations, a dynamic captured by what is known as costly signaling 
theory.96  One insight from this Article is that these signals now are being 
sent through agency actions.  In this section, I briefly provide some 
background on costly signaling theory in international relations and then 
show how administrative actions have become vehicles for such signals. 
The basic logic of signaling theory in international affairs is that when 
one nation’s government takes an action at some expense, other nations 
observe that action, find it credible because it was costly to take, and then 
adjust their negotiating behavior accordingly.  For example, Professor Jide 
Nzelibe has shown that when Presidents decide not to authorize acts of 
force unilaterally, but instead take the costly step of seeking congressional 
authorization, “the President sends a more credible signal of the United 
States’ resolve to prosecute the conflict.”97  Presumably, the adversary 
nations respond by ratcheting up their war preparations or capitulating to 
U.S. demands.  Similarly, Professor Rachel Brewster has observed that, if 
Congress were to enact significant climate change legislation, it would 
serve as a costly signal to other nations about the United States’ willingness 
to engage in treaty talks on climate change and contribute significantly to 
combating the global problem.98  Other nations may respond by 
reciprocating U.S. efforts to fight climate change.  As Brewster explains, 
“[t]his unselfishness on the part of the United States raises the possibility 
that other states will act similarly.”99 
Just as the President and Congress can send costly signals of negotiating 
positions, so too can agencies.  Indeed, under both Presidents George W. 
Bush and Barack Obama, the EPA has used its decisions to send different 
signals about the terms on which the United States is willing to engage in 
negotiations on climate change. 
The signal under Bush became part of the Supreme Court case 
Massachusetts v. EPA.100  In that case, multiple groups petitioned the EPA 
 
 95. Peter Eavis, Exporting U.S. Rules for Foreign Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2014, at 
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 96. See supra note 19. 
 97. Jide Nzelibe, A Positive Theory of the War Powers Constitution, 91 IOWA L. REV. 
993, 1022 (2006). 
 98. See Rachel Brewster, Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block:  Incrementalism and 
National Climate Change Legislation, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 245 (2010). 
 99. Id. at 259. 
 100. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
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to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles.101  The EPA 
rejected the petition in part because of foreign policy concerns.  In 
particular, the EPA was concerned that “unilateral EPA regulation of 
motor-vehicle greenhouse gas emissions might also hamper the President’s 
ability to persuade key developing countries to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions.”102  The EPA’s logic was that other nations will only cut their 
emissions as a part of a quid pro quo deal with the United States.  If the 
United States unilaterally cuts greenhouse gas emissions, other nations will 
free ride off of the United States’ efforts. 
The signal contained in the EPA’s decision not to regulate greenhouse 
gas emissions was that the United States was not willing to take any climate 
change action or agree to any treaty that did not also wring emissions 
concessions from developing nations.  In game theory terms, the United 
States did not want to invest in a public good while other players were free 
riders. 
The EPA under the Obama Administration has recently sent a very 
different, more encouraging signal.  The signal first came through the 
EPA’s proposed rule capping greenhouse gas emissions from new coal 
plants.103  Current market conditions make the construction of new coal 
plants unattractive.104  The proposed rule would make such construction 
even less likely because the plants would have to develop and employ 
expensive technology to limit emissions.105 
The proposed rule also offers foreign policy benefits.  As the EPA 
explained, the proposed rule “demonstrate[s] global leadership” in advance 
of international talks on climate change.106  By taking the costly step of 
challenging the coal industry, the Obama Administration was signaling its 
willingness to contribute to the global fight on climate change.  As 
mentioned earlier, this American willingness—the world’s number two 
carbon polluter—helped to bring about a cooperative agreement between 
the United States and China, the world’s number one carbon polluter.107  
Other nations may respond to this signal by reciprocating and increasing 
their efforts or willingness to sign and implement an international treaty or 
multilateral agreement on the matter. 
This signaling rationale is not entirely inconsistent with the logic that the 
EPA used under the George W. Bush presidency.  Bush’s EPA was 
concerned that U.S. action would lead to free riding, and Obama’s EPA is 
assuming that U.S. action can spur reciprocal action from other nations.  
Both free riding and reciprocity can occur at the same time because 
 
 101. Id. at 505. 
 102. Id. at 513–14. 
 103. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Statutory 
Sources, 79 Fed. Reg. 1430 (Jan. 8, 2014). 
 104. See EPA, supra note 1. 
 105. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Statutory 
Sources, 79 Fed. Reg. at 1430 (explaining that the proposed rule would force new coal plants 
to implement carbon capture technologies). 
 106. See EPA, supra note 1. 
 107. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
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different nations will respond differently to U.S. signals depending on their 
own circumstances and decision making.  The question is whether the good 
achieved through the sum of other nations’ reciprocal efforts to fight 
climate change outweighs the costs created when other nations decide to 
free ride off of U.S. efforts.  I will leave answering this question to the 
foreign policy experts.  My primary point is that the EPA, under two 
different administrations, has used the same issue—the regulation of 
climate change—to send different costly signals to foreign nations about the 
United States’ willingness to contribute to the global fight against climate 
change. 
In sum, agencies routinely consider foreign affairs factors before they act.  
They take into account hard obligations under international law, how a 
particular action might affect the agency’s reputation and relationships 
overseas, how foreign nations might respond to the content of a regulation, 
and what international negotiating position is signaled by the agency action. 
II.   AGENCY DECISION MAKING 
AND THE INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION DILEMMA 
The paradigmatic case of an agency considering international factors 
involves an agency deciding whether to adopt a standard that is coordinated 
with other nations or whether to maintain its own domestically crafted 
regulation.  I will refer to this as the international coordination dilemma. 
This part examines the dilemma from two different angles.  Part II.A 
models agency decision making with regard to the dilemma using a stylized 
ideal point model from political science and applies this model to real world 
facts.108  This model shows how agencies must consider not only whether 
to coordinate, but also whether such coordination can take place on terms 
more favorable to the United States.  Part II.B views the dilemma from an 
institutional design perspective.  It examines whether domestic institutions 
can be designed to make it more likely that agencies will engage in 
beneficial coordination with foreign regulators and whether these 
institutions can push the outcomes of such coordination closer to American 
preferences.  Drawing from the international affairs literature on domestic 
constraints, this section shows that there is a trade-off between these two 
goals.  Institutional designs that make coordination more likely will also 
tend to reduce the United States’ bargaining power to dictate the terms of 
such coordination.  This section concludes by discussing how this finding 
has implications for judicial review and presidential oversight of agencies. 
A.   An Ideal Point Model of Agency Decision Making 
and the International Coordination Dilemma 
This section introduces a stylized ideal point model of how agencies face 
the international coordination dilemma and applies the model to a couple of 
 
 108. See Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, How Not to Lie with Judicial Votes:  
Misconceptions, Measurement, and Models, 98 CAL. L. REV. 813, 820 (2010) (explaining 
how ideal point models are often used to explain roll call votes in Congress). 
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real world cases.  The model assumes that agencies make a good faith effort 
to identify and consider the full range of significant factors that determine 
whether a regulatory action improves public welfare in the United States.109  
The model ignores oversight from Congress and White House offices, and 
it assumes that only one agency is making the decision without input or 
influence from other agencies.110  I make these simplifying assumptions in 
order to isolate as best as possible the influence international coordination 
benefits have over agency decision making, irrespective of other influences 
such as industry capture, political oversight, and competition among federal 
agencies.  The following section on institutional design will take a closer 
look at how some of these influences impact agency decisions involving 
international coordination. 
1.   The Model 
Imagine a line that represents the range of policy outcomes an agency 
could choose for a particular regulatory problem.111  One point on the line 
is the “domestic ideal point,” which represents the policy outcome that 
would maximize utility if the agency were to focus exclusively on 
considerations internal to the United States and ignore the content of 
foreign and international policies on the same matter.112  Some utility is lost 
if U.S. regulators enact policies that depart from this ideal point, and the 
size of the utility loss increases as regulators move farther away from the 
ideal point.113  For shorthand, I will refer to these losses and gains as 
“domestic utility.” 
Another point on the line represents the policy outcome that aligns with 
an international norm or standard.  I will refer to this point as the 
“international point.”  The international point is unlikely to be the same as 
the domestic ideal point because it was either formed by a foreign nation 
 
 109. This assumes that agencies are relatively free to enact the optimal policy without 
constraints from domestic interest groups. See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational 
Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 115 (2009) (noting that, in 
the real world, agencies “are not free to pursue optimal global public policy for its own sake” 
and “one should expect that their positions will be shaped by the preferences of domestic 
constituencies”). 
 110. See generally Neomi Rao, Public Choice and International Law Compliance:  The 
Executive Branch Is a “They,” Not an “It,” 96 MINN. L. REV. 194, 200 (2011) (showing how 
U.S. international policy can be affected by competition among agencies with divergent 
interests). 
 111. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 
MICH. L. REV. 53, 65 (2008) (modeling the preferences of the median voter as an ideal point 
on a policy space). 
 112. One can also imagine this point as the policy that the United States should enact if it 
were the only nation that existed. See David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Sovereignty and 
Delegation in International Organizations, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77, 84 (2008) 
(referring to the “stand-alone” ideal point as the policy that a nation would enact if it were 
the only country that existed). 
 113. In economic terms, utility is negatively correlated with the distance between the 
domestic ideal point and the actual enacted policy. See Stephenson, supra note 111, at 65 
(“The voter’s utility is a decreasing function of the distance between the policy outcome and 
the voters ideal point.”). 
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that has different preferences than the United States or it reflects a 
compromise among various nations.  Thus, when a U.S. agency adopts a 
policy that aligns with the international point, it is setting a policy that 
creates costs from the loss of domestic utility. 
To flesh out the model further, assume that an agency is tasked with 
formulating a policy for a particular regulatory problem X.  The domestic 
ideal point is policy outcome X1.0.  However, a group of foreign nations 
have already addressed the same problem and compromised by agreeing to 
policy outcome X2.0.  The United States cannot negotiate with the nations 
and cannot convince them to change their standard to X1.0.  The agency has 
only two discrete policy choices:  X1.0 or X2.0.  A choice of X2.0 would 
produce coordination benefits, perhaps by creating network effects that 
improve gains from trade, but would at the same time incur costs, perhaps 
through the internal costs to U.S. regulators and the regulated parties.  
Conversely, a choice of X1.0 would create the benefits of adhering to the 
United States’ ideal range and the concomitant domestic utility of that 
choice, whereas the costs of that same decision could include harm to the 
U.S. foreign relations position or a reduction in trade with those foreign 
nations.  The question for the agency is simply whether the benefits of the 
international point outweigh the costs of departing from a domestic ideal.  If 
X2.0 is too far away from the domestic ideal, the United States would be 
better off sticking to its own ideal standard and not joining the international 
arrangement.114 
If we relax the assumption that X2.0 is fixed and allow for the possibility 
that it could be renegotiated or otherwise altered, the decision making 
becomes slightly more complicated.  Imagine once again that X1.0 represents 
the domestic ideal point and X2.0 the foreign standard, but now there is a 
range of policy options in between, represented by the points X1.1, 
X1.2 . . . X1.9.  The U.S. agency can stick to its domestic ideal point, adopt 
the foreign standard, or try to arrange a compromise at any of these points.  
Now, the agency must determine whether it can convince the foreign 
nations to adopt a coordinated standard closer to X1.0 and, if so, at what 
cost.  Even if the benefits of international consistency outweigh the costs of 
diverging from the domestic ideal point, the agency has to consider whether 
the United States can extract a deal that captures the benefits of 
international coordination but on terms more favorable to the United States. 
2.   Applying the Model to Facts 
This section applies the ideal point model to two regulatory cases.  The 
first, taken from the Second Circuit case Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture,115 concerns the Department of 
 
 114. In buyer-seller deals, this analysis is similar to the seller’s “walk-away point,” the 
point at which he will abandon the sale because the offered price is too far below the asking 
price. See Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789, 
1791–92 (2000). 
 115. 613 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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Agriculture’s regulation of packing materials.  The second case involves the 
Department of Transportation’s National Highway Traffic and Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) and its regulation of automobile side impact 
safety.116 
a.   The Packing Materials Regulation 
The Department of Agriculture regulates packing materials used in 
international trade.117  A few years ago, the agency had to decide whether 
to enact a stricter standard backed by U.S. environmentalists or to adhere to 
an international standard that was formed pursuant to a multinational 
convention signed by the United States.118  The international standard was 
voluntary but multi-nation adherence to the standard would generate trade 
benefits by standardizing trade requirements for packing materials.119  
However, the international standard was far from ideal for domestic 
purposes because it allowed shippers to use wood packing material 
susceptible to wood-boring insects, which can bury themselves into the 
wood in foreign countries and then emerge in the United States, where the 
invasive insects pose a threat to the ecosystem.120  The environmentalists 
urged the department to require substitute packing materials that do not 
contain these wood-boring pests.  The department conceded that this 
approach “was likely the most effective means of eliminating pest risk 
associated with the importation of goods.”121 
In terms of the model, assume that the environmentalists’ 
recommendation represented the domestic ideal point because it minimized 
domestic risk at low domestic costs, and assume that the international 
standard departed significantly from this ideal.  The first question for the 
Department of Agriculture was whether the benefits from international 
consistency outweighed the losses to domestic utility from the increased 
risk of invasive insects.  The agency seemed to believe that it did because it 
favored the “the harmonization and facilitation of global trade” over 
“competing considerations of pest control and environmental concerns.”122 
But a second, more complicated question was whether international 
coordination was possible on terms more favorable to the United States.  
The environmental group argued that it was, observing that the 
“international market for substitute packing materials might expand over 
time if a phased-in substitute-materials-only requirement were promulgated 
 
 116. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Side Impact Protection; Grant in Part, 
Denial in Part of Petition for Rulemaking, 65 Fed. Reg. 33,508 (May 24, 2000) (rejecting the 
European standard); cf. Anthropomorphic Test Devices, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,304 (Dec. 14, 2006) 
(adopting the ES-2re test dummy standard, a modification of the European standard that it 
had rejected earlier). 
 117. See Importation of Unmanufactured Wood Articles; Solid Wood Packing Material, 
64 Fed. Reg. 3049 (Jan. 20, 2009). 
 118. Natural Res. Def. Council, 613 F.3d at 79–85. 
 119. Id. at 80 n.2. 
 120. Id. at 79. 
 121. Id. at 81. 
 122. Id. at 86. 
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by the United States.”123  In other words, if the United States adopted its 
ideal standard, it would lower the cost for other nations to do the same, thus 
making the standard more attractive to foreign nations. 
But, on the other hand, there were a couple of significant barriers to 
convincing foreign nations to reconsider the international standard.  First, 
there was a massive collective action problem.  A convention consisting of 
173 nations established the recommended international standard.124  While 
the United States is a powerful nation and pressure from the United States 
can go a long way, it would be quite an ordeal to reopen the drafting 
process for the international standard and produce something acceptable to 
so many nations.  Moreover, there were procedural costs.  The standard was 
promulgated pursuant to a formal convention, under which any standard 
would have to be set or amended in accordance with a 151-page procedural 
manual, thus increasing the cost of revisiting the issue.125 
After taking these factors into consideration, the agency decided that the 
gains from international coordination were great and that such coordination 
was unlikely to occur on terms more favorable to the United States because, 
in the agency’s words, “the [international] negotiations would be time-
consuming, and their outcome would depend upon a variety of factors, 
including developing nations’ technical capacities and anticipated economic 
growth.”126 
b.   The Automobile Side Collision Regulation 
The calculus looked quite different for the Department of Transportation 
when it considered a petition, filed by an international trade association 
representing carmakers’ interests, that asked the agency to replace its 
automobile side impact standard with the European standard.127  If the 
agency made this change, then United States and European carmakers 
would be able to sell their cars in each other’s markets without changing 
specifications to meet each jurisdiction’s requirements. 
Assume that the United States’ status quo represented the United States 
ideal, a realistic assumption given that the agency determined that the U.S. 
standard was better than the European standard because it was safer.128  The 
question for the agency was whether the benefits of coordination 
outweighed the costs of departing from this ideal.  The agency ultimately 
concluded that they did not and decided to stick with the U.S. standard.129 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See generally FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., INTERNATIONAL PLANT 
PROTECTION CONVENTION, 2012 PROCEDURE MANUAL:  STANDARD SETTING (Nov. 16, 2012), 
available at https://www.ippc.int/sites/default/files/documents//1356016213_IPPCProcedure 
Manual_Part3_StSet_.pdf. 
 126. Natural Res. Def. Council, 613 F.3d at 85–86. 
 127. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Side Impact Protection; Grant in Part, 
Denial in Part of Petition for Rulemaking, 65 Fed. Reg. 33,508, 33,508 (May 24, 2000). 
 128. Natural Res. Def. Council, 613 F.3d at 81–85. 
 129. Id. 
1934 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
Again, though, the agency considered whether coordination was possible 
but on terms closer to the United States’ ideal of a safer standard.  The 
agency, after rejecting the proposal to adopt the European standard, 
observed that “our first steps will be to work with the Europeans to cure 
[their standard’s] problems.”130  The agency’s decision to achieve 
coordination on better terms proved fruitful.  Six years later, the Europeans 
had improved their standard, and NHTSA announced that it planned to 
adopt the European standard “in an upgraded Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 
Standard on side impact protection.”131 
What explains NHTSA’s willingness to hold out until European 
regulators moved closer to the United States’ preferred safety standard 
while the Department of Agriculture would not try to convince other 
nations to budge on the packing material regulation?  At least one major 
factor was the cost of negotiating due to the number of parties involved.  
NHTSA could work closely with its European counterparts to address its 
concerns with the European standard, and the two sets of regulators could 
negotiate among themselves.  By contrast, the Department of Agriculture 
would have had to win approval from officials representing many more 
countries with different and disparate regulatory preferences.  Also, because 
NHTSA and its European counterparts were negotiating informally, they 
were not hampered by the same formality that would have met the 
Department of Agriculture had it tried to update the international standard 
pursuant to the lengthy international convention. 
B.   Domestic Institutions and International Interagency Coordination 
The model developed in Part II.A shows that agencies (1) often want to 
coordinate with international and foreign regulators because coordination 
brings benefits, and (2) would prefer that coordination occur on terms as 
close to the United States’ ideal policy as feasible.  Given these two goals, 
the institutional design question becomes whether domestic institutions can 
be set up to either increase the likelihood of beneficial international 
coordination or to make it more likely that such coordination favors the 
United States. 
This section shows that there is a trade-off between these two goals.132  I 
first explain this trade-off in more detail.  I then discuss implications of this 
trade-off for judicial review of agency decisions involving the negotiation 
 
 130. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Side Impact Protection; Grant in Part, 
Denial in Part of Petition for Rulemaking, 65 Fed. Reg. at 33,512. 
 131. Anthropomorphic Test Devices, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,304, 75,305 (Dec. 14, 2006) 
(adopting the ES-2re test dummy standard, a modification of the European standard that it 
had rejected earlier). 
 132. As Robert Schmidt has explained:  “[D]omestic political constraints may help a 
divided party claim greater value in the external bargain[, but i]f the constraints are 
severe . . . they may reduce the efficiency of the external bargain, perhaps reducing it to the 
no agreement outcome.” Robert J. Schmidt, International Negotiations Paralyzed by 
Domestic Politics:  Two-Level Game Theory and the Problem of the Pacific Salmon 
Commission, 26 ENVTL. L. 95, 117 (1996). 
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and implementation of international coordination agreements.  I also 
discuss implications for presidential oversight of these agency decisions. 
1.   The Cooperation-Bargaining Advantage Trade-Off 
When agencies bargain with their foreign counterparts over the terms of a 
regulatory standard, they face constraints at home that limit the range of 
policies that they can successfully implement domestically.  These 
constraints come from actors, such as the President, Congress, the courts, 
and powerful interest groups, who have the power to block agency 
implementation of a standard.133  As a matter of institutional design, the 
strength of these domestic constraints can be adjusted.  For example, courts 
can be stripped of jurisdiction over a set of agency decisions, thus removing 
this constraint on the agency.  Adjusting the level of domestic constraints 
on agencies has effects on both the likelihood of coordination and the 
substantive bargaining outcomes. 
Consider first the effect on the likelihood of coordination.  Reducing the 
strength of domestic constraints on agencies makes it more likely that an 
agency will be able to coordinate with its foreign counterparts, while 
increasing the strength of the constraints makes coordination less likely.  
When domestic constraints are weak or nonexistent, there is a greater range 
of standards that an agency can successfully implement at home.  To 
borrow the terminology used in the literature on international affairs, there 
is a larger “win set.”134  This larger win set make coordination more likely 
to occur because there are simply more policy options that can feasibly 
satisfy the negotiating parties and their respective domestic constraints.  For 
example, imagine that the Department of Transportation is trying to 
coordinate an automobile safety standard with European regulators, and 
there are ten possible safety standards on the table.  If the President has said 
that five of the options are unacceptable to him, then half of the options are 
no longer viable and an agreement is less likely.  But, if the President has 
said that he will support any coordinated agreement that the Department of 
Transportation reaches, then presumably all ten options are still on the 
table—at least for the United States—and this large win set makes a 
coordinated agreement more likely. 
Now consider the second, and less intuitive, effect involving bargaining 
power.  The greater the domestic constraint, the more bargaining power the 
agency has over its foreign counterparts.135  The reason is that, when 
several policy options are on the table, the U.S. agency’s bargaining 
 
 133. See Verdier, supra note 109, at 126 (observing that agencies negotiating with their 
foreign counterparts “are instead politically and legally accountable to numerous domestic 
constituencies, including not only their superiors in the executive branch but also the 
legislature, the courts, the media, and the public”). 
 134. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics:  The Logic of Two-Level 
Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427, 437 (1988). 
 135. See id.; see also Brewster, supra note 98, at 253 (noting that “a government’s 
bargaining position is strengthened when it can credibly commit to accepting only its 
preferred treaty draft (or one that is very close)”). 
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position is strengthened if it can credibly threaten that only its preferred 
option, or some option close to it, would satisfy U.S. domestic constraints.  
Thus, if the U.S. agency and its foreign counterparts want to achieve a 
coordinated outcome, coordination can only take place with a policy more 
favorable to the United States. 
To illustrate this effect, consider again the example of the Department of 
Transportation negotiating over a coordinated standard with European 
regulators.  The negotiations start with ten possible options on the table.  
But the Department of Transportation says that the President will only 
support the United States’ three preferred options and thus coordination can 
only occur with one of these three standards.  With so few options on the 
table, coordination is less likely.  However, if Europe stands to benefit 
sufficiently from coordination with the United States and it believes the 
domestic constraint is real, it will likely capitulate and agree to an option 
that is more favorable to the United States. 
Taken together, these findings show that there is a cooperation-
bargaining advantage trade-off when designing domestic institutions that 
oversee agency decisions involving international coordination.  High 
domestic constraints produce less cooperation but give the United States a 
greater bargaining advantage.  Weak domestic constraints lead to greater 
international coordination but sacrifice American bargaining leverage.136 
2.   Judicial Review As a Domestic Constraint 
on International Interagency Coordination 
This trade-off has significant implications for how we consider the role 
of courts in reviewing agency decisions on international coordination.  
Consider that courts have several times declined to exercise jurisdiction 
over agencies’ negotiation and implementation of international coordination 
agreements because of concerns that judicial oversight would constrain the 
executive.137  As Richard Stewart has observed, some courts worry that 
they will “impair the ability of the executive to conclude and promptly and 
efficiently implement international agreements.”138  What these courts may 
have overlooked, though, is that, by refusing to exercise jurisdiction, they 
were removing a domestic constraint that could benefit the executive by 
giving the executive a bargaining chip. 
To illustrate this trade-off with more concrete detail, consider the D.C. 
Circuit case Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative.139  The 
United States Trade Representative (USTR) was negotiating the North 
 
 136. These findings are an extension of a leading international affairs article by Robert 
Putnam, who showed that a domestic constraint, such as the need for legislative approval on 
the executive, could be a bargaining advantage for the executive. See Putnam, supra note 
134, at 434.  Putnam showed that a nation’s bargaining advantage is increased if it can 
credibly show to other parties that it faces a domestic constraint that limits the range of 
options it can accept and implement at home. Id. 
 137. See Stewart, supra note 16, at 726. 
 138. Id. 
 139. 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
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America Free Trade Agreement with Canada and Mexico.140  U.S. 
environmental groups were worried that the agreements would override 
existing domestic environmental protections, and they sued to compel the 
USTR to assess the agreement’s adverse environmental effects.141  The 
court held that it had no jurisdiction because the USTR had not yet taken a 
final agency action.142  Such finality would not occur until the USTR 
submitted the agreements for presidential and congressional approval, a 
decision that the court also lacked power to review.143  The result was that 
the court would not have jurisdiction at any point in the negotiations. 
The court may have been reluctant to assert jurisdiction because it would 
affect the executive’s ability to conduct foreign affairs.144  However, by 
refusing to exercise jurisdiction, the court made it harder for the USTR to 
credibly threaten that it could not agree to any deal that did not have strong 
environmental protections because otherwise the deal could be bogged 
down in U.S. courts over claims that it did not meet statutory obligations 
relating to the environment.  Ultimately, the lack of jurisdiction made it 
more likely that a deal would be implemented but less likely that the terms 
would reflect U.S. environmental values. 
A similar effect can be seen in the case Jensen v. National Marine 
Fisheries Service.145  That case involved the U.S.-Canadian coordination of 
Pacific Ocean fishing rules.  The nations set up a regulatory scheme in 
which an international agency—the International Pacific Halibut 
Commission—recommended fishing rules subject to approval by the 
American and Canadian heads of state.146  These rules were then 
implemented domestically.147  The Jensen case concerned a rule that 
fishing vessels must throw back halibut that was incidentally caught in nets 
set to catch other fish.148  U.S. owners of fishing vessels challenged the 
enforcement of the rule by the domestic acting agency, the National Marine 
Fisheries Service (NMFS), and argued instead for a rule that allowed them 
 
 140. Id. at 917–19. 
 141. The groups were worried about “the agreements’ possible preemptive effect on 
various federal and state environmental regulations,” and they wanted the USTR to prepare 
an environmental impact statement under NEPA. Id. at 918–19. 
 142. Id. at 923 (“As plaintiffs have failed to identify any final agency action upon which 
our jurisdiction under the APA could be grounded, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of 
their claims.”). 
 143. Id. at 919. 
 144. See Stewart, supra note 15, at 727 (“Deference to executive flexibility is also 
reflected in Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative.”). 
 145. 512 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 146. Convention for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean 
and Bering Sea, U.S.-Can., March 2, 1953, 5 U.S.T. 5, 8–9. 
 147. This kind of scheme is quite common. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Great 
Lakes and International Environmental Law:  Time for Something Completely Different?, 54 
WAYNE L. REV. 1571, 1586–89 (2008). 
 148. Jensen, 512 F.2d at 1190 (“They complain of a regulation enacted by the 
Commission which prohibits them from keeping halibut which they catch in their nets 
incidentally to other fish upon which they concentrate their efforts.”). 
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to keep some percentage of halibut caught in certain areas.149  The court, 
instead of viewing the matter as a NMFS action subject to judicial review, 
categorized the matter as a presidential action that was not subject to review 
because “presidential action in the field of foreign affairs is committed to 
presidential discretion by law.”150 
By declining to exercise jurisdiction, the court freed the executive to 
implement an internationally coordinated standard without worrying about 
judicial vetoes.  But the court also hampered the executive’s ability to 
negotiate future rules more favorable to U.S. interests because the holding 
made it impossible for the U.S. executive to credibly argue to the 
international agency and the Canadians that a particular standard was 
unacceptable because it would likely be blocked in U.S. court. 
If a general pattern emerges of courts declining to exercise jurisdiction in 
these kinds of cases, it could result in a more widespread decrease in U.S. 
bargaining power.  In particular, foreign officials would learn that the U.S. 
judiciary is not a constraint on agencies implementing international 
agreements and would adjust their negotiating posture by refusing to view 
the U.S. judiciary as a relevant actor that can take certain policy options off 
the negotiating table. 
My point here is descriptive and not normative.151  I am not urging courts 
to exercise jurisdiction and reject the domestic implementation of 
international agreements more often.  But the findings of the coordination-
bargaining advantage trade-off can have normative implications.  One 
potential extrapolation of these findings is that judicial deference regimes 
should be sensitive to the executive’s goals in particular cases.152  In any 
given case, it could be that bargaining advantage is more important to the 
executive than increasing the likelihood of coordination.  In these cases, if 
the judiciary truly wants to aid the executive, it would do better to exercise 
jurisdiction and potentially halt the implementation of an international 
agreement on coordinated regulatory standards.  If a court were to block 
implementation, the nations’ agencies could return to the negotiating table 
and credibly claim that certain options were off the table because of 
domestic opposition from the judiciary.  This claim could give the United 
States a significant bargaining advantage. 
 
 149. Id.  Presumably they wanted to keep halibut caught in areas where halibut 
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 150. Id. at 1191. 
 151. My descriptive finding is consistent with Professor Daniel Abebe’s recent article 
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3.   Presidential Oversight As a Domestic Constraint 
on International Interagency Coordination 
A similar trade-off can be seen in how Presidents choose to oversee 
agency decisions about whether to coordinate their standards with foreign 
regulations. 
Consider the potential effects of President Obama’s 2012 executive order 
promoting international regulatory cooperation.153  Among other 
provisions, the order tasks agencies with considering “regulatory 
approaches by a foreign government” with the purpose of eliminating 
“differences between the regulatory approaches of U.S. agencies and those 
of their foreign counterparts [that] might not be necessary and might impair 
the ability of American businesses to export and compete 
internationally.”154  This order increases the likelihood that U.S. agencies 
will adopt standards coordinated with foreign regulations.155  At the same 
time, though, the order lessens domestic constraints on agencies seeking to 
coordinate regulations and thus may make it more likely that any such 
coordination occurs with regulatory details that come from foreign and not 
U.S. agencies. 
The lessening of domestic constraints comes from the publicly 
observable fact that the President is unlikely to veto a domestic agency’s 
adoption of a foreign regulatory standard that is of roughly similar 
stringency as the existing U.S. standard.  This presidential position could 
make it more likely that any differences between the two standards are 
reconciled in favor of the foreign nation.  To illustrate, imagine that a U.S. 
agency and a foreign government agency have each adopted different 
regulatory standards for the same regulatory problem.  Both agencies agree 
that coordination is preferable.  The U.S. agency asks the foreign agency to 
switch to the U.S. standard.  However, the foreign agency demurs, arguing 
that its head of state does not want the agency to copy U.S. regulatory 
standards for a variety of political reasons.  The foreign agency then asks 
whether, in the interest of international coordination, the U.S. agency would 
adopt its standard.  The U.S. agency cannot turn around and argue that the 
President is averse to having U.S. agencies adopt foreign-made standards 
because the President has publicly declared the exact opposite position.  As 
a result, under this highly stylized example, the gap between United States 
and foreign regulations is more likely to be bridged with the U.S. agency 
agreeing to move closer to the foreign agency’s position instead of vice 
versa. 
 
 153. Exec. Order No. 13,609, 77 Fed. Reg. 26,413, 26,413 (May 1, 2012). 
 154. Id. at 26,413–14. 
 155. See, e.g., Harmonization of Airworthiness Standards—Fire Extinguishers and Class 
B and F Cargo Compartments, 79 Fed. Reg. 38,266 (July 7, 2014) (to be codified at 14 
C.F.R. pt. 25) (stating that the proposed rulemaking “would eliminate differences between 
U.S. aviation standards and those of other civil aviation authorities by creating a single set of 
certification requirements for transport category airplanes that would be acceptable in both 
the United States and Europe”). 
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President Obama’s executive order may have the effect of exacerbating 
an existing trend that favors European over U.S. standards.  Professor 
Gregory Shaffer has observed that, when coordinating with European 
regulations, “the United States has made most of the changes” and adopted 
“international standards that mirror [European] ones.”156  Shaffer 
hypothesizes that this trend is due in part to the size of the European 
market, which is larger than the U.S. market and thus gives Europe a 
bargaining advantage because U.S. businesses are eager for access to this 
market.157  If this finding is right, then President Obama’s executive order 
may reinforce U.S. tendencies to adopt European standards. 
I do not mean to suggest that President Obama’s executive order is ill-
conceived.  On net, it is likely that the order produces benefits from newly 
coordinated standards that outweigh the costs from the possibility that the 
details of these standards come more from foreign regulators than from U.S. 
regulators.  Nevertheless, the basic descriptive point remains that President 
Obama has enacted an order that could reduce the U.S. agencies’ bargaining 
advantages in order to increase gains from international cooperation.  If we 
are to properly calibrate domestic institutions that affect international 
interagency coordination, we must take into account these kinds of impacts. 
III.   LEGAL DOCTRINE AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION 
OF AGENCY ACTIONS 
Doctrinally, the most pressing question involving the internationalization 
of agency actions is whether agencies can rely on international factors to 
support their actions under judicial review and, if so, which ones.  This part 
suggests that the current law establishes a presumption that agencies can 
rely on international factors, even when Congress has not expressly 
authorized such considerations. 
This part proceeds as follows.  It begins by providing background on 
hard look review, the process through which courts review agency actions 
to determine in part whether the agency has relied on permissible factors to 
support its actions.  It then shows how, over the past thirty years, the D.C. 
Circuit has developed a body of case law creating a presumption that 
agencies can consider international considerations, even when the enabling 
statutes are silent on the matter.  The final section discusses Massachusetts 
v. EPA, which held that the EPA’s consideration of an international factor 
was invalid, and asks whether that holding should change our understanding 
of the presumption developed by the D.C. Circuit.158  Applying the 
taxonomy developed in Part I of this Article, I suggest a narrow reading of 
Massachusetts v. EPA that would keep intact the D.C. Circuit’s 
presumption in favor of international factors. 
 
 156. See Gregory Shaffer, Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals:  The Prospects and 
Limits of New Approaches to Transatlantic Governance Through Mutual Recognition and 
Safe Harbor Agreements, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 29, 73–74 (2002). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
2015] INTERNATIONALIZATION OF AGENCY ACTIONS 1941 
A.   Hard Look Review:  Permissible and Impermissible Factors 
Hard look review is the process through which courts ensure that agency 
decisions are based on a “consideration of the relevant factors.”159  If 
Congress has expressly authorized the consideration of a factor, then 
agencies clearly can rely on that factor.  The problem occurs when the 
agency’s enabling statue is silent or ambiguous as to a factor.  In these 
instances, courts have adopted two sometimes competing presumptions, 
which I will refer to as the logical relevance and impermissible politics 
presumptions. 
The logical relevance presumption simply holds that, when Congress is 
silent as to a factor, courts will presume that an agency can consider that 
factor if it is “logically relevant” to its decision.160  Furthermore, if a factor 
is logically relevant, agencies can rely on that factor absent a clear 
congressional intent to the contrary.161  These presumptions have been 
affirmed in a line of cases in the D.C. Circuit, the most important circuit for 
administrative law purposes because of the volume of administrative law 
cases it hears and its reputation for handling those cases well.162 
Meanwhile, the impermissible politics presumption holds that agencies 
cannot rely on crude political factors to justify their decisions.  This 
approach is rooted in a strand of case law suggesting that judicial review of 
agency action is “a means of cabining political discretion.”163  The most 
relevant case in this line of jurisprudence is the Supreme Court’s 1983 
decision Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto 
Insurance Co.,164 which is now seen as establishing that agencies must 
 
 159. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971); see also 
Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1307–09 (2007) (explaining how hard look review relates to other 
administrative law doctrines such as Chevron and Skidmore); Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary 
Administrative Law As Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 490–505 
(2010); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification:  Rethinking Recent Proposals to 
Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 490–99 
(1997) (describing how hard look review creates uncertainty about how courts will treat 
agency decisions and how this uncertainty can discourage agencies from adopting rules); 
Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial Review, 58 
ADMIN. L. REV. 753 (2006) (showing how agencies can increase their chances of surviving 
hard look review by investing more resources in compiling a record for judicial review); 
David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 2317 (2010) (arguing that there is no 
difference between hard look review and any other standard of review because courts 
invariably look to the basic “reasonableness” of the agency decision). 
 160. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Factors Can an Agency Consider in Making a 
Decision?, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 67, 73. 
 161. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 162. See CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT 23–46 
(1999); see also Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution:  The 
Administrative State, the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890–1950, 123 
YALE L.J. 266, 389 (2013) (“In about 1970, the D.C. Circuit rapidly transformed into a de 
facto specialized court for agency litigation.”). 
 163. CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:  RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL 
OF BUREAUCRACY 193 (1990). 
 164. 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
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“explain their decisions in technocratic, statutory, or scientifically driven 
terms, not political terms.”165 
Taken together, these two approaches suggest that, under hard look 
review, agencies generally can base their actions on any logically relevant 
factor except political factors. 
Applied to international considerations, the doctrinal question becomes:  
Which international considerations are logically relevant factors that 
agencies can use and which are impermissible political factors?  Below I 
scour the case law to help answer this question. 
B.   D.C. Circuit Precedent on International Considerations 
Over the past few decades, the D.C. Circuit has decided a string of cases 
in which it held or suggested that an agency could rely on a variety of 
international factors, even in the absence of express authorization by 
Congress.  These cases establish a presumption in favor of allowing 
agencies to rely on international factors.  This section briefly discusses each 
of these D.C. Circuit cases to show how, collectively, they create this 
presumption. 
1.   Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 
v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission166 is the first D.C. Circuit opinion I could find on the matter of 
international considerations by agencies.  The 1981 case involved a 
challenge to a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) decision to allow the 
export of nuclear materials to the Philippines.167  In its decision-making 
process, the agency relied on international factors to help decide several 
questions, among them, the agency’s consideration of foreign impact on 
American interests and the impact on the global commons, and the court 
upheld the agency’s consideration of each factor.168 
First, the agency had to determine whether it had authority to assess risks 
to the “global commons” under NEPA, which requires agencies to issue 
environmental impact statements regarding all significant actions affecting 
the environment but is vague about whether and how agencies should 
consider international or global risks.169  The agency decided that it had 
such authority in part out of respect for the spirit of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which the United States had signed.170  
Although the treaty does not expressly require nations to consider global 
 
 165. Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 5 (2009). 
 166. 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 167. Id. at 1348. 
 168. Id. at 1365–66. 
 169. Id. at 1353 (“The Commission interpreted NEPA to require consideration of 
environmental impacts on the United States, and to permit consideration of impacts on the 
global commons.”). 
 170. Id. at 1360 n.68. 
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environmental impacts, the agreement was designed to minimize 
environmental dangers from the spread and use of nuclear material.171  The 
NRC’s decision to assess how the exportation of nuclear material to the 
Philippines would affect the global commons was consistent with this 
purpose of the treaty.  By acting in concert with this international goal, the 
NRC helped the United States maintain its standing as a nation properly 
concerned with the effects of nuclear proliferation. 
Second, the agency had to consider whether the export of the nuclear 
material would in fact harm the global commons.172  It concluded that the 
risk to the global commons was insignificant because “American abstention 
from international nuclear trade risks leaving the field to less responsible 
suppliers and encouraging uncontrolled proliferation.”173  By approving the 
deal and working with the Philippines, the United States could better 
“prevent deterioration of the worldwide environment” than other nations.174 
Third, the agency had to consider whether to assess the environmental 
impacts specific to the Philippines and its population.175  Here, the agency 
concluded that it did not have the requisite legal authority under NEPA.  
The agency’s primary rationale was that such site-specific evaluations 
would require the agency to demand that the Philippines give it access to 
local sites, which would push against “principles of national sovereignty” 
and impact U.S.-Filipino relations.176 
In terms of the taxonomy developed in this Article, the agency relied on 
factors involving international law and international reputation, the 
minimization of global spillover effects, and the United States’ relationship 
with a foreign nation.  The D.C. Circuit upheld the agency’s use of each 
factor in its broader ruling affirming the issuance of the license.  More 
specifically, characterizing the case as one “of agency jurisdiction and legal 
obligation,”177 the D.C. Circuit held that an environmental impact statement 
was not required for the issuance of a license to the Philippines when the 
extraterritorial effect of the agency action is limited to the recipient country, 
here the Philippines.  Highlighting international cooperation, the court 
found that the NRC’s actions were consistent with U.S. foreign policy;178 to 
the court, it was Congress’s intent under NEPA that bilateral or multilateral 
 
 171. During the Cold War, states adopted numerous treaty-based agreements targeting 
nuclear testing in response to environmental consequences that this testing posed.  The cross 
border pollution, dangers to human health, and the perception of threat to global security 
created the political will to attack the problem of testing nuclear weapons. See Winston P. 
Nagan & Erin K. Slemmens, National Security Policy and Ratification of the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty, 32 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1, 12–13 (2009). 
 172. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 647 F.2d at 1383 (“NRC has concluded that risk to 
the global commons, if existent at all, is bound to be negligible.”). 
 173. Id. at 1347. 
 174. Id. at 1353. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 1359. 
 178. Id. at 1366. 
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cooperation between nations take precedence over unilateral American 
action, here the environmental impact statement.179 
2.   Center for Auto Safety v. Peck 
A few years later, the D.C. Circuit addressed a case that concerned a 
straightforward issue of international trade benefits.  In Center for Auto 
Safety v. Peck,180 the Department of Transportation amended a bumper 
safety standard to make it less stringent.181  One reason the agency gave for 
the change was that the new standard aligned with European standards and 
thus made it cheaper for American and European auto companies to 
manufacture cars for both markets.182  Challengers to the regulation jumped 
on this reasoning, arguing that it was impermissible for the agency to 
consider international factors.183  The D.C. Circuit, with then-Circuit Judge 
Scalia writing for the court, disagreed.  It held that the NHTSA was relying 
on the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, “which instructs each federal agency 
that is developing standards to ‘take into consideration international 
standards and . . . if appropriate, base the standards on international 
standards’” when it noted the increased “international harmonization.”184  
The court went further, though, stating that, even if the statute had not 
mentioned international factors—and even though the NHTSA itself noted 
that the Trade Agreements Act did not require selecting “the standard that 
best promoted [international] harmonization”—the attack on the agency’s 
consideration of international trade “seems to us questionable, since 
harmonization produces public benefits by promoting international 
commerce.”185 
While the court’s statement was dicta, it nevertheless suggests that the 
judges were favorably predisposed to allowing agencies to consider gains 
from international trade as a factor when their enabling statutes were silent 
on the matter. 
3.   AMSC Subsidiary Corp. v. FCC 
In a 2000 case, the D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC’s decision to license 
mobile satellite systems based in part on international considerations.186  
For decades before the case, many nations had regulatory schemes that 
afforded monopoly power over the satellite systems in their jurisdictions.187  
 
 179. Id. at 1348. 
 180. 751 F.2d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 181. Id. at 1342. 
 182. Id. at 1367 (“Finally, NHTSA noted that the less restrictive standard would increase 
international harmonization.”). 
 183. Id. at 1367–68 (“Petitioners assert that this is irrelevant to the requirements of the 
Cost Savings Act.”). 
 184. Id. at 1368. 
 185. Id. 
 186. AMSC Subsidiary Corp. v. FCC, 216 F.3d 1154 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 187. In the Matter of Amendment of the Commission’s Regulatory Policies to Allow 
Non-U.S. Licensed Space Stations to Provide Domestic and International Satellite Service in 
the United States, Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 24,094, 24,097 (Nov. 26, 1997). 
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In 1997, the United States joined a WTO agreement requiring nations to 
abandon their monopolies and authorize foreign firms to serve customers if 
there was adequate spectrum for local and foreign firms to operate.188  The 
agreement was designed to produce positive global spillover effects from 
innovation in the field.  Pursuant to the agreement, the FCC amended its 
procedures to establish that it will grant licenses to foreign satellite 
operators if such a license is in the public interest, which includes a 
consideration of “foreign policy[] and trade issues.”189  Notably, these 
international factors were not expressly authorized in the agency’s enabling 
statute.190 
When a foreign satellite system applied for a license, the FCC granted the 
license over the objections of AMSC Subsidiary Corp., a U.S. operator.  In 
particular, AMSC’s objections were that the FCC, through its foreign 
licensing, harmed its ability to meet its future spectrum needs.191  The 
agency concluded that denying the license “would be inconsistent with U.S. 
market access commitments in the WTO Agreement” and that granting 
“these applications will serve the public interest by facilitating increased 
competition in the mobile satellite services market.”192 
In terms of the taxonomy, the agency relied on international law and 
concerns over international spillover effects in its licensing decision.  The 
D.C. Circuit upheld the agency’s consideration of international factors as 
part of an “adequate explanation” necessary to support the agency’s 
action.193 
4.   National Ass’n of Clean Air Agencies v. EPA 
In 2007, the D.C. Circuit upheld the EPA’s consideration of an 
international agreement.  In National Ass’n of Clean Air Agencies v. 
EPA,194 the EPA had set standards for airplane emissions in order to match 
international standards.195  If the EPA had not updated its standards, the 
United States would have been out of compliance with an international 
convention that it had signed.196  An advocacy group wanted the EPA to 
enact standards that were more stringent than the international standards, 
 
 188. AMSC, 216 F.3d at 1157 (“The adoption by the United States in 1997 of the WTO 
Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services, however, obligated the United States to 
open its satellite markets to foreign systems licensed by other WTO member countries.”). 
 189. Id. 
 190. 47 U.S.C. §§ 308(b), 309 (2012). 
 191. AMSC, 216 F.3d at 1159. 
 192. 14 FCC Rcd. 20,798, 20,799, 20,813 (Nov. 30, 1999). 
 193. AMSC, 216 F.3d at 1160. 
 194. 489 F.3d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 195. Id. at 1223–24 (noting that the EPA “issued a final rule increasing the stringency of 
the oxides of nitrogen . . . emission standards applicable to newly certified commercial 
aircraft gas turbine engines under § 231 of the Clean Air Act.”).  
 196. Id. at 1225 (stating that “‘by virtue of being a party to’ the Chicago Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, the United States 
is a member of the United Nations International Civil Aviation Organization,” which is an 
organization under the United Nations comprised of 189 member countries, tasked with 
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but the EPA protested that studying those standards would have taken too 
much time and pushed the EPA far past the deadline for compliance with 
the international standards.197  The group responded that the EPA’s 
enabling statute, which was silent as to international considerations, did not 
allow the EPA to rely on factors such as international compliance.198 
The D.C. Circuit sided with the EPA, stating that it “refused ‘to infer 
from congressional silence an intention to preclude the agency from 
considering factors other than those listed in a statute’”199 and holding that 
the EPA could consider “international standards.”200  The court found that 
Congress had “delegated expansive authority to EPA to enact appropriate 
regulations applicable to the emission of air pollutants from aircraft 
engines,” and because the EPA’s rule was not “manifestly contrary to the 
statute,” the court deferred to the EPA’s reasoning and standards.201  In 
terms of the taxonomy of international considerations, the court upheld the 
agency’s consideration of an international agreement designed to control 
regulatory spillover effects. 
5.   International Union, United Mine Workers of America 
v. Mine Safety Health Administration 
Most recently, an international factor was raised in a case about the 
regulatory standard governing the volume of mine refuge chambers.202  In 
International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Mine Safety 
Health Administration, the acting agency, the Mine Safety and Health 
Administration (MSHA), had promulgated a safety standard regarding 
rescue chambers for miners that was laxer than the mine workers union 
wanted.203  However, the standard was in line with international standards.  
In upholding MSHA’s standard, the court cited the consistency with 
international standards as one valid reason in support of the rule.204  The 
court seemed to invoke international consistency as evidence of the 
 
 197. Id. at 1225–26 (“But [the EPA] reasons that ‘assess[ing] the costs (and emission 
benefits) of more stringent standards’ would have required additional time that EPA did not 
then have ‘since [it had] already gone past the implementation date of the [international] 
standards.’” (quoting Control of Air Pollution From Aircraft and Aircraft Engines, 70 Fed. 
Reg. 69,664, 69,675, 69,677–78 (Nov. 17, 2005)). 
 198. Id. at 1229 (stating that the group argued that the Clean Air Act “is intended to 
promote the ‘public health [and] welfare,’ not to ‘establish[ ] consistency with international 
standards’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7571(a)(2)(A) (1996))). 
 199. Id. at 1230 (quoting George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616, 623–24 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998)). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety Health Admin., 626 F.3d 
84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 203. Id. at 89–90. 
 204. Id. at 97 (noting that the “15 cubic feet [standard] was consistent with international 
standards”).  Interestingly, the agency had not based its standard on international 
consistency.  Instead, international consistency was listed as a benefit in comments 
submitted to the agency. Id. at 97 n.6.  Nevertheless, the fact that the court noticed these 
comments and cited the international consistency as a benefit suggests that it viewed 
international consistency as a legitimate factor that supported the agency action. 
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practicability and potential reasonableness of MSHA’s standards—that is, 
the court treated consistency with the international standard as a valid 
epistemic factor. 
*     *     * 
In sum, in several cases dating back to 1981, the D.C. Circuit has issued 
opinions in which the court has presumed or suggested that agencies can 
justify their decisions based on various kinds of international network 
effects, spillover effects, epistemic factors, and foreign affairs factors.  
Taken together, these cases strongly suggest that agencies can 
presumptively consider international factors, at least in the most important 
circuit for administrative law purposes. 
C.   International Considerations and Massachusetts v. EPA 
In 2007, the Supreme Court decided Massachusetts v. EPA.  Some have 
offered broad readings of the case that would seem to upend the 
presumption in favor of international factors established by the D.C. 
Circuit.  I suggest narrower readings, based in part on the taxonomy 
developed in Part I of this Article, that largely maintain this presumption.  I 
do not claim that these narrower readings are superior under some theory of 
legal interpretation, but rather that they are reasonable and plausible 
interpretations of Massachusetts v. EPA’s holding that attorneys and courts 
must take seriously. 
This section first recounts the relevant aspects of Massachusetts v. EPA.  
While I have referred to the case earlier in the Article, the discussion here 
draws on the facts directly relevant to the doctrinal discussion.  This section 
then discusses several possible interpretations of the case.  It concludes by 
discussing the important normative consequences if courts were to accept 
the narrowest reading of the case suggested here. 
1.   Massachusetts v. EPA 
In Massachusetts v. EPA,205 a group of states, local governments, and 
private organizations filed a rulemaking petition to the EPA to regulate the 
emissions of four greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles, including 
carbon dioxide, pursuant to the EPA’s responsibility under the Clean Air 
Act.206  Under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, the EPA shall 
prescribe and revise “standards applicable to the emission of any air 
pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor 
vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution 
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or 
welfare.”207 
The EPA denied the rulemaking petition, citing two reasons for its 
denial:  first, the EPA stated that the Clean Air Act did not authorize the 
 
 205. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 206. Id. at 505. 
 207. Id. at 506 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1)). 
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agency to issue mandatory regulations to address global climate change, 
and second, even if the EPA had the authority, it would be unwise to do 
so.208  The EPA cited a handful of reasons why it would be unwise to 
promulgate regulations regarding greenhouse emissions, but one was “that 
regulating greenhouse gases might impair the President’s ability to 
negotiate with ‘key developing nations.’”209 
Although the Supreme Court noted that it had “neither the expertise nor 
the authority to evaluate these policy judgments,” the Court nonetheless 
rejected the foreign policy rationale, as well as the EPA’s argument that it 
lacked authority to promulgate rulemaking; the Court held that the EPA’s 
enabling statute required the agency to act pursuant to the petition and to 
base its decision on “scientific judgment,” which made the foreign policy 
considerations impermissible rationales.210  However, in the same 
paragraph, the Court implied that the lack of statutory authority could have 
been remedied if the EPA’s foreign policy judgments were based on 
consultations with the Department of State.211  In the Court’s words:  
“Congress authorized the State Department—not EPA—to formulate 
United States foreign policy with reference to environmental matters 
relating to climate . . . [and] EPA has made no showing that it issued the 
ruling in question here after consultation with the State Department.”212 
2.   Several Possible Interpretations of Massachusetts v. EPA 
There are several possible interpretations of Massachusetts v. EPA with 
regard to its impact on which international considerations are presumptively 
permissible for an agency to consider. 
a.   The Broad Interpretation of Massachusetts v. EPA 
A prevailing broad reading of the case is that it prohibits agencies from 
considering seemingly all foreign policy rationales, such as how agency 
actions impact U.S. foreign relationships, reputation, and negotiations. 
Justice Scalia, writing in dissent, read the majority opinion in this way 
and castigated the Court for going against established practice:  “The 
reasons EPA gave are surely considerations executive agencies regularly 
take into account (and ought to take into account) when deciding whether to 
consider entering a new field:  the impact such entry would have on other 
Executive Branch programs and on foreign policy.”213 
 
 208. Id. at 511. 
 209. Id. at 533–34 (quoting 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,931 (Sept. 8, 2003)).  For a 
discussion of how the case had broad supranational implications, see Hari M. Osofksy, The 
Intersection of Scale, Science, and Law in Massachusetts v. EPA, 9 OR. REV. INT’L L. 233 
(2007). 
 210. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533–34. 
 211. Id. at 534. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 552 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Similarly, Professor Kathryn Watts has suggested that Massachusetts v. 
EPA extends State Farm’s rejection of impermissible political factors to 
foreign policy rationales.214  Watts argues against the normative desirability 
of such a holding, but as a descriptive matter writes that “Massachusetts 
loudly reiterates the message that State Farm has been read to have 
established more than twenty years earlier:  agencies must justify their 
decisions in expert-driven, not political, terms if they wish to convince 
courts that reasoned decisionmaking has occurred.”215  Professor Mark 
Seidenfeld disagrees with Watts normatively but concedes that 
descriptively “she is correct that [Massachusetts v. EPA and other] cases do 
not invite agencies to proffer political influence as a factor in arbitrary and 
capricious [or hard look] review.”216  Professors Adrian Vermeule and Jody 
Freeman have similarly described how the holding lends itself to this kind 
of interpretation.  They read the Court as establishing that the EPA, and 
presumably acting agencies in similar cases, “may not consider extraneous 
non-statutory factors such as foreign policy.”217 
Under these readings, the Court is viewed as establishing that foreign 
policy considerations are presumptively not allowed unless Congress 
clearly signals otherwise in the statute—contrary to the presumption the 
D.C. Circuit has established over the past several decades. 
b.   A Narrow Interpretation of Massachusetts v. EPA 
Massachusetts v. EPA easily lends itself to narrower interpretations, 
though.  If we apply the taxonomy developed in this Article, we see that the 
EPA was using one particular subtype of foreign policy consideration—that 
is, the effect on the United States’ international negotiating position.  The 
Court could be seen as prohibiting only this subtype of foreign policy 
consideration and not foreign policy rationales generally. 
As a policy matter, there are reasons to draw a line between this subtype 
and other foreign policy rationales.  When agencies consider other foreign 
policy factors, they typically do so because their actions directly impact the 
well-being of other nations.  For example, in the first D.C. Circuit case 
discussed above, the NRC considered U.S.-Filipino relations because its 
decision to license the sale of nuclear material to the Philippines directly 
impacted welfare in that nation.218  By contrast, when an agency considers 
what its action signals to foreign nations about the United States’ 
negotiating position, it is considering a far more speculative and amorphous 
effect.  There are several steps from the signal to concrete international 
outcome.  The agency must first consider what other nations currently 
assume about the United States’ negotiating position.  It must then consider 
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how its action changes those assumptions and how other nations will react 
to those changes.  Then, the agency must determine whether those nations’ 
reactions will have a significant effect on international talks or global 
regulatory efforts, a ridiculously complicated calculation given the complex 
nature of multinational talks. 
This distinction leads to two problems.  First, because the effect on 
international negotiation is speculative, agencies are more likely to 
miscalculate and make the wrong decision.  Second, if agencies can 
consider how their actions affect international negotiations, they can inject 
foreign policy considerations into a range of domestic regulatory decisions 
that are only tenuously connected to foreign nations and foreign affairs.  In 
today’s world, a host of regulatory problems are subject to ongoing, future, 
or potential international talks.  It would be problematic if agencies could 
look to any of these talks and then make significant adjustments to domestic 
regulatory actions that are not a direct product of agreements reached in 
these talks.  An amicus brief filed by former Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright gives voice to these two concerns.219  Albright characterized the 
EPA’s international negotiations rationale as “a speculative foreign policy 
concern,” and she observed that, “[g]iven the number of domestic issues 
that are now the subject of international negotiation, the opportunities for 
executive invocation of such a foreign policy trump are substantial.”220 
c.   The Narrowest Interpretation of Massachusetts v. EPA 
Massachusetts v. EPA is reasonably subject to an even narrower reading 
as well.  Under this reading, agencies can consider how their actions affect 
U.S. negotiating positions if and only if the claimed impact is based on the 
expertise of a diplomatic agency like the State Department.  This reading 
finds support from the fact that the Court itself seemed bothered that the 
“EPA has made no showing that it issued the ruling in question here after 
consultation with the State Department.”221  Like the Court, Albright too 
suggested that her concerns about agencies abusing foreign policy 
rationales to justify arbitrary decisions would have been ameliorated had the 
EPA consulted with other expert agencies.  She noted that  
the agency came up with its policy rationale entirely on its own, even 
though it lacked the relevant expertise[, and] [n]othing in the record 
suggests that the EPA consulted with the Department of State, the 
National Security Council, or any other relevant agency with foreign 
policy expertise, on whether its foreign policy position was 
appropriate.222 
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Further support for this reading comes from a federal district court in 
California, which observed that the “decision in Massachusetts teaches that 
when the court seeks to determine what United States foreign policy is, it 
must look to sources other than EPA because EPA’s pronouncements of 
what is United States foreign policy, and what constitutes interference with 
that policy, are not authoritative.”223 
As a practical matter, requiring agencies to consult with the Department 
of State before invoking a rationale based on international negotiation 
effects would help ameliorate the concerns that such rationales are too 
speculative and can lead to agency abuse.  If the Department of State has 
been significantly involved in an agency’s decision-making process, the 
foreign affairs implications of that decision are likely to have been vetted by 
foreign policy experts who are less likely to miscalculate the influence of 
the agency action on international negotiations.  Moreover, requiring 
consultation with another agency introduces procedural and substantive 
costs that will deter agencies from invoking this rationale too often.  
Procedurally, holding significant consultations with another agency 
consumes resources.  Substantively, when an acting agency gives another 
agency a chance to offer significant and early input on its decisions, the 
agency sacrifices some degree of decision-making autonomy because the 
consulted agency can now also shape the regulatory action.224  Agencies 
will want to avoid these procedural and substantive costs, thus reducing the 
concern that international negotiation effects will find their way into many 
run-of-the-mill domestic regulatory actions. 
3.   The Effects of the Narrowest Interpretation of Massachusetts v. EPA 
If courts accept the narrowest interpretation suggested here, there are 
clear normative consequences.  Generally, such an interpretation keeps in 
place the presumption that agencies can rely on international factors even 
when their enabling statutes are silent on the matter.  The agency will need 
to consult with foreign policy experts when taking into account certain 
foreign policy considerations, but otherwise the presumption remains intact. 
More specifically, this reading provides a way for courts to distinguish 
the EPA’s reasoning in Massachusetts v. EPA and the EPA’s reasoning in 
its recent climate change action under President Obama.  Recall that the 
EPA has recently proposed a rule limiting greenhouse gas emissions from 
new power plants, particularly coal plants, based in part on the signal it 
would send about American willingness to join international efforts to fight 
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global climate change.225  At first glance, this reasoning appears similar to 
the invalid foreign policy rationale used in Massachusetts v. EPA.  But 
unlike the EPA’s decision-making process in that case, the EPA this time 
has consulted with foreign policy experts.  The EPA based its foreign policy 
rationales on recommendations developed by Obama’s Interagency Task 
Force on Carbon Capture and Storage, a group that included the 
Department of State.226 
Under the reading that I have offered of the Court’s holding in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, this distinction is enough for a court to hold that the 
EPA’s consideration of how its cap on emissions from coal plants would 
impact international negotiations is a permissible factor that contributes to a 
satisfactory explanation supporting the action. 
I am not claiming here that this narrowest reading and the holdings it 
would produce are the best based on some normative metric.  Rather, my 
claim is that this interpretation is a reasonable and plausible reading of 
Massachusetts v. EPA that courts and agencies should take seriously.  
Narrowness is often a virtue in legal interpretation.227  Narrowness is 
especially valuable when broader readings would upend longstanding legal 
understandings, as they would here.  The Supreme Court has remarked that 
“Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme 
in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide 
elephants in mouseholes.”228  The same could be said of the Supreme 
Court—that is, the Court should not be presumed to make fundamental 
changes to legal practice and doctrine in vague terms.  The narrowest 
interpretation of Massachusetts v. EPA honors this maxim by reading the 
case’s vague holding to make the smallest possible change to established 
D.C. Circuit precedent. 
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CONCLUSION 
The internationalization of agency actions has become a mainstream 
phenomenon.  The Federal Register is replete with agency actions based in 
part on international considerations.  This trend will only become more 
important as the world becomes increasingly globalized and regulators in 
different nations have greater incentives to coordinate their regulations.229  
This Article has contributed to our understanding of the internationalization 
of agency actions in several ways.  First, it developed a comprehensive 
taxonomy of international factors relied on by agencies.  Second, it 
developed a stylized model of agency decision making to better understand 
how agencies consider whether and when to coordinate their standards with 
foreign and international regulatory standards.  Third, from an institutional 
design perspective, it showed that there is a trade-off between coordination 
and bargaining advantage.  Domestic institutions can be designed to 
promote international coordination by agencies or to afford U.S. agencies 
bargaining power over their foreign counterparts but not both at the same 
time.  Fourth, it clarified the legal doctrine on when agencies can rely on 
international factors to justify their actions under judicial review.  In 
particular, it suggested a new interpretation of Massachusetts v. EPA that 
keeps in place a presumption in favor of allowing agencies to rely on 
international factors, even in the absence of express congressional 
authorization. 
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